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I. Introduction 
 
With its turbulent and volatile legal evolution, the right to an abortion in the 
United States still remains a highly contested issue and has developed into one of the 
most divisive topics within modern legal discourse. This right, which was established in 
1973 by the groundbreaking case of Roe v. Wade, legally allows a woman to surgically or 
medicinally choose to terminate her pregnancy. (Solinger, 1998, 95) In recent years, this 
right has again been thrust into the political arena with the advancement of pre-natal and 
stem cell technology where an already embroiled debate has been renewed. (Page, 2006, 
25-26)  In particular, both the political and legal contention now centers around when a 
human being attains legal and physical personhood. Additionally, this controversy also 
surrounds when precisely that entity is endowed with all the rights and liberties enjoyed 
by citizens of the United States. (Tribe, 1990, 115-116) Ultimately, these and other 
elements of this perpetual debate have created a stagnating problematic situation for 
rights claims. In both a legal and human rights context, the mother’s and unborn child’s 
rights are constructed to conflict and eventually compete in this realm of bodily 
jurisdiction.  
Over the past several decades since the formal inception of the right to an abortion 
in modern law, a definitive and inceasingly constraining shift has been identified within 
both the political and legal realm. (Solinger, 1998, 103-104) As other legal scholars have 
pointed out, this restrictive and transformative process has predominately manifested in 
abortion jursiprudence. As Luker notes, these increasing restraints on the right to abortion 
appear to be largely launched by pro-life activists and conservative legislative pundits 
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fervently commited to eventually rendering this right void and ineffective. (Luker, 1985, 
216) Many legal experts have thus characterized this constraining movement as a 
political and social backlash to claims of judicial legislation on such a complex issue at 
the core of the human experience. (Solum, 2006, 26) With an increasing politicization of 
this women’s right of reproductive choice in both the legal and political realms of 
society, this perpetual “clash of absolutes” appears to have no end in sight. (Tribe, 1990, 
237-238)  
After much review of the legal literature on this perennial debate, I believe this 
increasingly prohibitory shift can be explained through an examination of the gradual 
development of abortion jurisprudence. I argue that this historical evolution of abortion 
case law can be deconstructed into four phases: extension, articulation, transition and 
restriction. The first phase of extension encompasses approximately the decade before 
and up to the formal enunciation of a right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade (1973). This 
period began in 1965 with the textual establishment and extention of reproductive privacy 
to married persons in Griswold v. CT. (Richards, 1986, 14-15) Here, the Court found that 
the precincts of the bedroom and subsequent marital activities lie witin a zone of privacy. 
Thus, the prohibition on the use of contraceptives was found unconstitutional under this 
logic. (Conkle, 1987, 3) In Roe, the Court again utilized the zone of privacy framework to 
include the right of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy. (Butler and Walbert, 
1992, 101-102) Thus, this initial phase of extension significantly characterizes the 
Supreme Court’s construction of the conceptual boundaries that embody and further 
expand privacy rights to pregnant women.  
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The second phase of articulation spans from the time of Roe to around the mid-
1980s. This phase in abortion jurisprudence is largely depicted by a rise in legislative and 
statutory attempts in  regulating the public funding aspects of the right to an abortion. 
(Solinger, 1998, 112-113) During this time, the Court made strident attempts at both 
clarifying and re-affiriming their decision in Roe by invalidating legislation and 
regulations aimed at narrowing the parameters of abortion rights. Both the Thornburgh 
and Akron cases demonstrate the Court’s commitment to adhering to the legal precedent 
set by Roe and maintaining the legal force of the right to an abortion. 
The third phase, transition, occurred predominantly in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. This changing phase portrayed another attempt by the Court to bring clarity to 
their decisive stance on the abortion issue. During these years, the Court drastically 
shifted their use of both the logical framework and testing standards constructed in Roe. 
The plurality’s decision in Webster endorsed a substantial “restatement” of Roe’s 
trimester scheme. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 573) In Casey, the Court appeared to 
follow through by transitioning to a new standard of review that is still in effect today. 
(Howard, 1993, 7-8)  
The final, current restriction phase is demonstrated by several cases decided 
during the early part of the 21st century. This constraining phase has opened the door for 
anti-abortion legal professionals, political pundits and state legislators alike to begin 
dismantling the foundational elements central to the legitimacy of the right to an abortion. 
(Richards, 1986, 21) As this new phase kicks into gear with various legal challenges to 
Roe bubbling up through the American judicial system everyday, one of the main 
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purposes of this thesis is to examine the most salient factors impacting the stability and 
legitimacy of emergent women’s rights within the United States.   
By deconstructing the political underpinnings and legal rationale of the right to an 
abortion through a systematic case law analysis, I will demonstrate that this right has 
been incrementally destabilized. This instability embedded in abortion jurisprudence has 
been primarily produced by a combination of textual ambiguity in the case law and 
judicial ambivalence regarding this complex area of law. In addition, I argue that the use 
of the largely discredited substantive due process doctrine to ground this contentious right 
has also contributed to the lack of legal stability. (Wimberly, 2007, 8-9) I assert that when 
these elements culminate in the realm of reproductive privacy the right to terminate a 
pregnancy becomes increasingly unstable and contested.    
With mounting legal instability due to a consistent lack of textual clarification by 
the Supreme Court, the right to an abortion is essentially fixated on a foundation of 
constitutional quicksand. (Howard, 1993, 12) Through an in-depth chronological 
synthesis of reproductive privacy case law and abortion jurisprudence in the main text of 
this thesis, I argue that this significant degree of systematic instability ultimately results 
in an inability to establish a firm legitimate foundation for abortion in constitutional law. 
The absence of a solidified legal foundation creates a porous illegitimate quality to the 
right to an abortion and imbues a level of vulnerability to the overturning power of the 
judiciary. Coupled with a largely fragmented Court on the issue, the legal future for the 
right to an abortion is a highly volatile and unpredictable one. With the recent additions 
of conservative Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito, the legality of the right to an 
abortion may in fact drastically change with the coming years. (Summers, 2006, 10)  
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Thus, a demonstrated failure on the part of the Court to devise a legitimate, stable 
framework for the legal grounding of this right has virtually compromised any future 
attainment of legitimacy through an entrenchment approach to constitutional law. With 
this in mind, I emphasize the necessity to depart from grounding this contentious right in 
a domestic rigid body of law, which has proved to be both ineffective and unsuccessful. 
Instead, I argue there first needs to be a re-conceptualization of the right to an abortion to 
incorporate a human rights element. The use of human rights oriented language would 
speak to the highly complex and multi-faceted nature of this right. Additionally, an 
integration of human rights language in codifying this right would acknowledge the 
inherent dignity, equality and self-determination of women as independent human beings 
with a freedom from the traditional constraints of society. (Thomas, 1997, 5-6) 
With a new, revitalized conception of the right to an abortion drawing from 
human rights discourse, it is then essential to construct both an enforcement and 
interpretive mechanism that will recognize and adhere to this re-conceptualization. Thus, 
I argue that in order to eventually implement this new contextual framework to legitimize 
this women’s right domestically, some international human rights legal values must be 
assimilated with constitutional norms. (Thomas, 1997, 7) In other words, this conceptual 
transition requires the right to an abortion to be first identified as a women’s human right 
and thus stabilized by adopting an automatic self-executing mechanism in the domestic 
rule of law. (Hovell and Williams, 2005, 12) 
This contextual integration of international and domestic bodies of law would not 
only imbue universally accepted legal values and norms in domestic jurisprudence, but 
also serve to eliminate the instability evident in abortion case law. By directing allocating 
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human rights to individuals through the implementation of a self-executing provision in 
law, this would largely bypass the subjectivity and illegitimacy of an overly active, 
legislating judiciary. (Richardson, 1990, 4) In essence, I assert this transformative shift in 
concept and legal framework from a domestic juridical structure to an international, 
human rights platform will prove more efficacious. This approach re-inscribes 
international legal legitimacy and eliminates the Court’s convoluted lexicon of terms 
upholding the right to an abortion. 
 
 
II. Research Design and Methodology 
 
In order to effectively and efficiently engage in an academic discussion of the 
numerous facets impacting abortion jurisprudence in the legal realm, an in-depth 
comprehensive definition of terms utilized in this thesis is essential. By both textually 
clarifying and substantially grounding these terms, this will bring a level of precision 
necessary to academically depict this convoluted issue. Additionally, an extensive review 
of the legal literature regarding this debate imbues a level of validity in my construction 
of variables. Through this discussion and review, I am able to adequately define the 
variables used to formulate my hypothesis and clearly sketch out the subsequent format 
of this thesis.  
The hypothesis espoused in this section is characterized by a cumulative, bi-
variable effect that directly impacts the dependent variable. To be more precise, the focus 
of this thesis asserts that an increase in judicial ambivalence, coupled with an increase in 
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textual ambiguity has directly led to this complex area of law remaining unsettled. With 
reproductive privacy and abortion jurisprudence residing in this uncertain legal state, the 
legitimacy of the right to an abortion is thus unstable and challenged. (Howard, 1993, 12) 
As demonstrated in recent judicial decisions on the issue, I argue that this pervasive 
instability and legal inconsistency has essentially left the door open for pro-life advocates 
and legislatures to begin dismantling this right. (Page, 2006, 16-17) In a larger sense, 
with highly a fragmented and convoluted abortion jurisprudence, I believe this has 
consequently created a problematic precedent in modern law that significantly 
compromises the future emergence of women’s reproductive rights. (Smearman, 2006, 
12)  
  Judicial Ambivalence    +   Ambiguity in Case Law           Decrease in Legitimacy of 
                  Abortion Rights 
                 = 
Decrease in Emergent            
Reproductive Rights       
 
                                                    
 The pictorial representation above demonstrates the central argument in this 
thesis. This clear diagram shows that both judicial ambivalence and textual ambiguity are 
the independent variables and that the degree of legitimacy of women’s abortion rights is 
the dependent variable. It is my assertion that culmination of judicial ambivalence and 
textual ambiguity in abortion case law directly undermines the legitimacy of the domestic 
right to an abortion. In other words, the combination of both factors has produced a lower 
degree of legitimacy of this right, which has contributed to its slow disintegration as a 
legal right. (Butler and Walbert, 1992, 91-92)  
As other scholars suggest, the recent increase in aggressive legislative attacks on 
this right have created, what I term, a restrictive phase in reproductive rights 
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jurisprudence as mentioned previously. (Page, 2006, 145-147) Thus, I also argue that the 
prominence of both elements in the decrease of legitimacy of abortion rights transmits to 
the larger umbrella term of reproductive rights. By negatively affecting the right to an 
abortion, this constraining shift prompted by the foundational instability of reproductive 
privacy has also led to a decrease in the legitimacy of emergent reproductive rights. Thus, 
the continuation of a significant lack of textual clarity and judicial consensus on the issue 
of abortion may produce dire, legal consequences for other reproductive rights. As Page 
suggests, “the groundwork is already being laid for the day that the federally protected 
right to contraception fades away” and other reproductive rights such as the use of in-
vitro fertility technology (IVF) and amniocentesis options. (2006, 165-166) I assert that 
the continued deteriorating legitimacy of the right to an abortion will have a negative 
over-arching impact and subsequently open the door for increased federal limitations on 
reproductive rights. (Jansen, 2007, 8-9) 
There are several important and salient concepts that have been introduced by this 
hypothesis, centering on ambivalence, ambiguity and legitimacy. Scholars within the 
field of both political science and legal studies have long debated the true definitional 
meaning of these rhetorical and contextual constructions. Yet, it is meaningful and 
essential to engage in a descriptive, definitional discourse to provide clarity and precision 
to the use of these concepts. This literature analysis and definitional discussion will 
greatly aid in clearly structuring my argument and synthesizing the abortion 
jurisprudence in the main section of this thesis.  
 The term ambivalence, by its own definitional nature, suggests and conjures 
analogous words such as confusion, hesitancy or uncertainty. (Mishkin, 1983, 2-3) 
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Although these are all pertinent connotations of the word, they present difficulty in the 
term’s particular utilization given the variance of interpretations of this word. To be more 
precise, I will employ this concept of ambivalence to refer to a dilemma of indecision and 
hesitancy among the justices of the Supreme Court. Other scholars, such as Mishkin, 
utilize this term in a similar fashion in describing a judicial apprehension to provide 
definitive parameters and set standards, as well as imparting a solidified precedent in case 
law. (1983, 5-6) The ambivalence depicted here is specifically characterized as judicial 
ambivalence within the thesis and occurs along a continuous spectrum of varying 
degrees. (Romero, 2006, 2) 
The difficulty here is that this basic conceptualization of judicial abstinence in 
sufficiently clarifying precedents and establishing solid standards can be attributed to a 
variety of causes. Additionally, this term is not widely accepted, documented and 
discussed within much of the legal literature, which leaves little leeway in crafting a 
largely applicable term. Thus, formulating a valid and precise definition for this concept 
is contextually harder given the lack of peer-reviewed literature in referencing this term. 
Nevertheless, I have distilled a working definition of judicial ambivalence with the help 
of prior formulations from both Mishkin and Romero.  
 Thus, it is important to discuss some of the background elements prompting 
ambivalence among the justices in order to fully devise and construct a clear definition. 
One of these key elements is the long debated role of judicial review in defining case law 
and interpreting the contextual meaning of the Constitution. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 
19-20)  This side discussion on the legitimacy and differing attitudes toward judicial 
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review will help to provide insight into the possible underlying reasons for renewed 
ambivalence among the justices with abortion case law.  
 Judicial review refers to the power and authority invested in the Supreme Court  
justices to make the determination if actions of the executive branch and regulations from 
the legislature are in accordance with the Constitution. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 15) 
The contention surrounding this concept stems from its non-constitutional basis and 
literal extension of explicit power over the legal system. (Nowlin, 2007, 4) In response to 
this controversy, two competing schools of thought (judicial restraint and judicial 
activism) have evolved that highlight both the dangers and benefits associated with this 
expansion of judicial power. (Tushnet, 1987, 2) In order to determine the presence of 
judicial ambivalence in reproductive case law decisions, it is helpful to first describe the 
ideological constructs of each school. Then it is possible to identify the potential, 
psychological implications that adopting either one of these ideologies may have on the 
mindset of a justice scrutinizing abortion jurisprudence. (Gerhardt, 2002, 17-18)   
 The two schools of thought primarily diverge of the concept of the degree of 
activity in the interpretation process of reviewing provisions for possible violation of 
Constitutional amendments. (Tushnet, 1987, 3) Judicial restraint is the restrictive stance, 
which advocates and only legitimizes the usage of judicial power if the law or legislation 
in question is in “clear collision” with the principles of the Constitution. (Sullivan and 
Gunther, 2004, 9). As articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion for the Court in 
the Marbury case, the duty of the justices is to uphold the integrity and continuity of the 
Constitution. Additionally, Marshall cautioned that arbitrarily overstepping the bounds of 
judicial jurisdiction would result in the destabilization and implicit undermining of the 
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rule of law. (Marbury v. Madison 1803) In essence, this position portrayed the 
Constitution as an immutable, supreme body of law that is resistant to change. With this 
mindset, modern strict constructionist justices such as Justice Scalia expound and call for 
a reserved stance in the determination and re-interpretation of constitutional principles. 
(Gerhardt, 2002, 17)  
Central to this stance is an understanding of applied ambivalence, which 
emphasizes a predisposition of apprehension in deciphering the constitutionality of laws. 
For example, when it comes to personal liberties and especially abortion case law, we see 
that the adoption of this conservative, judicial ideology by a justice significantly impacts 
their decision. (Gerhardt, 2002, 19) In particular, Supreme Court justices that adhere to 
this school of thought are more likely to refrain from expanding the scope of “personal 
liberty” even before a specific case reaches the Court. (Lindquist, Smith, and Cross, 
2007, 9-10) This suggests that justices who are categorized as strict constructivists are 
pre-disposed to be less pro-active in extending individual rights not explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution. I argue that justices who practice judicial restraint are not only going 
to strongly abstain from clarifying and grounding the unenumerated right to an abortion, 
but also stridently protest its survival in law. (Gerhardt, 2002, 19)  
On the flipside, judicial activism was popularized by the Warren court during the 
1960s and calls for a pro-active re-interpretation of constitutional principles. Judicial 
utilization of this school of thought has led to both the expansion of numerous rights and 
the overturning of state statutes and legislation. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 11) In the 
instance of abortion case law, this stance becomes even more controversial when cases 
are decided that hinge on the right to privacy. (Lindquist, Smith, and Cross, 2007, 2) This 
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liberal take on the role of the judicial branch openly opposes ambivalence regarding 
expanding individual liberties. Additionally, it emphasizes the necessity for actively 
shaping the rigid nature of law to adapt to the complexities and societal changes of our 
new age of modernity. (Tushnet, 1987, 2-3) Justices that adhere to this school of thought 
(such as Justice O’Connor) often support the continued existence of Roe and make 
textual efforts in clarifying its framework in law. (Gerhardt, 2002, 44)  
The controversy surrounding both competing schools of thought have led to stark 
criticism of the proper role of judicial review in reproductive privacy cases. As many 
legal critics argue, the decision in Roe is often viewed as an unparalleled, illegitimate 
exercise of judicial activism. (Tribe, 1990, 79) Tribe and other legal scholars have 
identified the vast contention and subsequent conflict particularly produced by the 
engagement of judicial activism in abortion case law. (Tushnet, 1987, 4) I argue that this 
staunch disagreement, controversy and non-consensus amongst the justices over judicial 
review methodology has prompted judicial ambivalence in abortion jurisprudence.  
One of the primary elements that reveal this degree of ambivalence is an 
examination of the decision outcome. In particular, an analysis on the occurrence of split 
decisions, unanimous decisions, concurrences and dissents in abortion case law implies 
the existence of some ambivalence in arriving at a consensus on the issue. Examining 
decision outcomes is an effective tool of measurement since it textually displays the 
reasons each justice gave for either their disagreement or consensus. (Stearns, 2002, 1-2) 
By tracking which specific justice agreed, dissented or concurred illuminates the degree 
and efficacy of the attempt to settle the case law. The element of disagreement inherent 
within split decision rulings in abortion jurisprudence suggests there is an apprehension 
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on the part of the justices to confer a solidified, binding precedent in this contentious area 
of law. (Gerhardt, 2002, 22)  
Another way I plan to measure judicial ambivalence is to examine if there was a 
shift or complete replacement of the framework used to justify a particular ruling. The 
presence of a shift is indicative of ambivalence in that a transition in logic, as 
demonstrated in the Casey ruling, suggests a judicial non-consensus with the central 
elements of the legal rationale. (Butler and Walbert, 1992, 18) Furthermore, completely 
discarding a previously held framework also signals a degree of judicial apprehension in 
that the Court must have identified a serious flaw in the logic for it to be unworkable. 
(Conkle, 1987, 3) With an underlying degree of contestation with the core principles 
established by a precedent, this suggests a hesitancy to reaffirm the original logic and to 
further abstain from clarifying it. (Garfield, 1986, 12) Here, judicial ambivalence is 
evidenced by an apprehension on the part of the Court to continue utilizing previously 
established legal rationale. 
A similar method that will be employed to test for ambivalence is the success and 
occurrence rate of partial/full overturns and reversals in the case law. Here, the holding 
will be analyzed in comparison to the prior related case and also according to whether 
there was a successful overturning of the case, as illustrated by Thornburgh overturning 
Akron. (Butler and Walbert, 1992, 18)  If an abortion or privacy case was overturned, this 
indicates ambivalence insofar that the logic and parameters established by the case was 
later viewed as fallacious possibly due to hesitancy in making a premature ruling. 
(Zampa, 1990, 6-7) There will be some discourse later in the case law analysis on the 
implications and innate ambivalence implied within the concept of stare decisis, which 
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literally translates to “stand by things decided.” (Solum, 2006, 26) This legalistic 
principle advocates adhering to prior legal precedents unless the logic has proven 
unworkable for future relevant case law. (Butler and Walbert, 1992, 201) This analysis on 
judicial overturning of previous abortion case law will be the last measure of judicial 
ambivalence used in this thesis. 
The second term widely utilized in this thesis is textual ambiguity. This concept, 
like ambivalence, also generates a multitude of definitions with a great degree of 
variance. For purpose of precision and accuracy, this term must also be defined in a 
systematic way and measured in a valid manner to ensure reliability during my case law 
synthesis.  
The central meaning of ambiguity, as used in this thesis, makes reference to the 
inconclusive meanings and unclear central holdings of Supreme Court decisions within 
the reproductive privacy area of law. (Zampa, 1990, 2) The emphasis here is on the 
confusing and often contradictory language employed by the Court possibly as a means 
to circumvent providing strict, solidified standards. (Schneider, 1993, 10) In essence, the 
distinction here is that specific court rulings (especially privacy and abortion case law) 
directly fail to provide a firm set of parameters and standards for the right to an abortion. 
Additionally, the Court utilizes convoluted terms and vague language that remains largely 
undefined and thus unclear. (Howard, 1993, 12) I assert that this textual ambiguity is 
produced by a severe lack of clarity within the decision, which further adds to the legal 
instability of this right. (Robertson, 1987, 7-8) In contrast with ambivalence, which is the 
mental/psychological component, ambiguity is thus the textually based physical element. 
It is manifested within the lack of precise and comprehensive definitions or standards to 
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sufficiently clarify the parameters of this newly established right to an abortion. (Howard, 
1993, 12) 
One of the most salient methods of testing for both subtle and overt forms of 
ambiguity in case law is through an in-depth, literary analysis of the decision from the 
Court. In particular, examining the rhetoric/diction usage and if the logic built upon these 
linguistic constructions withstands through time. As exemplified most prominently by the 
contentious nature of the right to privacy, rhetoric formulation plays an important role in 
the acceptance and legitimacy of the holding.  
The newly developed, legal construction of the “right to reproductive privacy,” as 
established by Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) still continues to maintain an aura of 
ambiguity given its purely interpretational and non-textual foundations. (Zampa, 1990, 3) 
I argue that this inherent lack of clarity in specifying the exact legal and constitutional 
roots of “privacy” has greatly buttressed the continuation of instability within the right to 
an abortion in modern law. (Schneider, 1993, 12-13) Coupled with loose, privacy-geared, 
Constitutional interpretation, this conception of a right to privacy is implicitly founded 
from the outlaying, shadowy realm of specifically the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 547) It is evident that the legal 
implications of the Griswold case certainly left the door open for ambiguity in Roe v. 
Wade (1973), which explicitly legalized and politicized a women’s choice in her 
reproductive capacities.  
Another method of measuring ambiguity is to determine if there was a clear 
attempt to re-affirm or clarify the logic in subsequent rulings of reproductive privacy case 
law. As exemplified in both the Webster and Casey decisions, the Court made a definitive 
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effort to re-affirm the central point in Roe, which was that the initial ruling still remains 
applicable in today’s society. (Johnson and Alexander, 2003, 5-6) Here, the implied 
necessity to re-affirm or re-emphasize the primary argument suggests there was a 
significant degree of ambiguity in the initial ruling. As demonstrated later in the case law 
synthesis, the Court appeared compelled to provide more lucidity in order to uphold the 
ruling, but instead added another layer of complexity to already convoluted abortion 
jurisprudence. (Howard, 1993, 5)  
Another method of testing for ambiguity is conducting an analysis on the reaction 
to the court decision, with an emphasis on the amount of contestation by legal scholars 
and legislative pundits. It is undeniable that the divisive Roe v. Wade (1973) decision 
generated mass amounts of controversy and immediate attempts to overturn the ruling. 
(Tribe, 1990, 17) Yet, the sheer amount of political and legal contestation suggests the 
existence of ambiguous and over-broad logic/standards. Many legal scholars such as 
Tribe and Luker argue that highly ambiguous language and inconsistent standards had 
essentially allowed for pro-life advocates to launch effective attacks in undermining the 
right to an abortion in law. (Luker, 1984, 156-157) I argue that the porous nature of the 
right to an abortion is created in part by this textual ambiguity pervasive throughout 
abortion jurisprudence.  
The final term that needs clarification and a precise definition in this thesis is the 
concept of legitimacy. The term legitimacy can also be defined and characterized by a 
myriad of varying conceptual ideas and formulations. Yet, a more exact description of 
this term as utilized in this thesis refers to the belief that judicial decrees are held as 
lawful, well reasoned and in compliance with national regulation and standards. In other 
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words, a law that is legitimate is not widely contested over the course of decades and is 
also enforced as dictated by the Court. (Farrell, 1998, 8) This multi-faceted term 
incorporates not only a legal and governmental element, but also contains a societal 
element. (Butler and Walbert, 1992, 102) Specifically, this thesis is attempting to 
examine the level of legitimacy by analyzing its approval and acceptance level on the 
legal dimension. I intend to measure legitimacy primarily on two levels: textually and 
judicially. The first way is to analyze whether the Supreme Court adhered to precedent in 
reproductive case law. If the previous decision were valid and legitimate, it would still 
prove workable and not be subject to changing subjective views in the matter. (Zampa, 
1990, 3) The second way I aim to measure legitimacy is to examine the degree of 
contestation in the forms of legal challenges to the Court’s decision. This is evidenced by 
the subsequent cases to Roe, in which regulations directly challenged the legitimacy of 
the right to an abortion. (Tribe, 1990, 109-110)  
Similar to gauging ambivalence and ambiguity among the justices, measuring 
legitimacy would involve textual analysis of each privacy and reproductive Supreme 
Court case listed below. I speculate that through examining adherence to legal precedent 
by lower circuit courts, as well as the Supreme Court adherence, this will exemplify the 
degree of legitimacy. (Farrell, 1998, 9)  
Legal scholars also look at the effects of contestation on the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court itself. As Tyler and Mitchell both note, the institutional legitimacy of the 
Court has also been challenged over the years as a result of their decision in Roe. (1994, 
9-10) Their conceptualization of judicial legitimacy ties back to an analysis of judicial 
review. They assert that the Court’s engagement with judicial activism by creating a right 
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to an abortion in law has consequently led many legal analysts to question the integrity 
and legitimacy of the Court. (Tyler and Mitchell, 1994, 10) As other scholars argue, these 
critical attacks on the Court’s illegitimate use of judicial authority through their policy-
making for the nation on the issue of abortion has had serious effects on the legal 
sustainability and legitimacy of the right to an abortion. (Smolin, 1992, 21) 
The case law that will be examined and synthesized is primarily drawn from the 
privacy and reproductive realms of law. The cases to be analyzed include: Foundations of 
Privacy [Lochner v. NY (1905)], Transition to Reproductive Privacy [Griswold v. CT 
(1965)], Establishment of a Right to Abortion [Roe v. Wade (1973)], Regulation of 
Abortion [Akron v. Akron Center of Reproductive Health (1983), Thornburgh v. ACOG 
(1986)], Reaffirmation and Modification of Roe [Webster v. Reproductive Services 
(1989)], Departure from Roe [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey (1992)]. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004) Each case will be systematically analyzed 
and measured for all three facets of my hypothesis: judicial ambivalence, textual 
ambiguity and legitimacy. 
The framework of the main text in this thesis is constructed in a chronological 
manner. As displayed above, I will begin with a discussion on the foundations of privacy 
in constitutional case law that precede Roe. The analysis in Lochner will provide a broad 
understanding of the Court’s construction of the substantive due process doctrine and its 
conceptualization of liberty as applied to individuals. (Conkle, 1987, 2) This examination 
will highlight the problematic nature with the use of substantive due process in justifying 
and subsequently expanding civil liberties in constitutional jurisprudence. (Johnson and 
Alexander, 2003, 3)  
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 The next section will focus on the formal articulation of reproductive privacy and 
its utilization to ground the right to an abortion in Roe. A textual analysis of Griswold 
will again emphasize the problem with the Court’s heavy reliance on the substantive due 
process doctrine as a means of justification given its capacity for judicial subjectivity, 
judicial activism and inconsistent legal logic. (Wimberly, 2007, 7-8) Additionally, it will 
also mark the Court’s use of highly ambiguous language and departure from sufficiently 
clarifying their logic without textually-derived constitutional principles. (Zampa, 1990, 3) 
The following synthesis on Roe will again depict this problematic trend amongst the 
members of the Court in utilizing unclear terms and logic to essentially construct a highly 
controversial, unenumerated right to an abortion. (Farrell, 1993, 10)  
The following section will continue to trace these problematic elements with the 
regulation of the right to an abortion. The synthesis of both Akron and Thornburgh will 
demonstrate the intensive divisiveness among the member of the Court and subsequent 
ambivalence in continuing to apply the Roe framework. (Prieto, 1984, 5-6) Judicial 
contestation regarding the inherent and central logic in Roe reaches its pinnacle in these 
cases, which again highlights the problematic nature of using ambiguous language 
coupled with judicial activism in this complex area of law. (Smolin, 1992, 2-3) 
The last section in the case law synthesis deals with the re-
affirmation/modification and subsequent departure from Roe. The cases that will be 
analyzed are both Webster and Casey, which will further demonstrate the Court’s 
struggle to sufficiently clarify and legitimately ground the right to an abortion using valid 
constitutional principles. (Chlapowski, 1991, 4) This examination of the case law will 
also mark the beginning of the Court’s departure for Roe’s central constructs and the 
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adoption of a new, equally ambiguous standard of review. (Zampa, 1990, 9) The Court’s 
adamant discarding of Roe’s framework and logic implicates an ambivalence to maintain 
this flawed foundation. By delivering a highly fragmented, contradictory and splintered 
decision in Casey, the Court has essentially paved the road for new aggressive regulations 
to be largely upheld in the coming years  (Schneider, 1993, 2-3)  
As many legal scholars speculate, the Court’s overt failure to develop and 
implement a solid, consistent framework has significantly compromised the stability and 
subsequent legitimacy of this right in modern law. (Howard, 1993, 12) I argue that this 
transition into a restrictive phase in abortion jurisprudence further exemplifies the highly 
problematic and fallacious nature of utilizing ambiguous terms, coupled with an 
ambivalent judiciary to adequately clarify them.  
Following the abortion case law synthesis is a brief discussion of the implications 
resulting from the Court’s actions in abortion jurisprudence within the results analysis 
section. Additionally, I review the accuracy of my hypothesis and initial assertion made 
in this section. With the results of my analysis laid out, I then transition into the 
concluding section of this thesis: human right policy implications. Within this section, I 
make my final assertion that the right to an abortion needs to be re-conceptualized and 
implemented using international human rights law. (Thomas, 1997, 3) I argue that by 
transitioning the right to an abortion into a women’s human right using a international 
law schema, this will prove more efficacious in both implementing and enforcing the 
right domestically. (Jackson, 2003, 12) I believe by adopting a South African approach to 
women’s human rights, coupled with the inclusion of a self-executing provision in 
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domestic law, the right to an abortion will be more stable and legitimate within the 
United States. (Hovell and Williams, 2005, 11-12)  
 
 
 
 
III. Reproductive Jurisprudence Synthesis 
 
A. Legal Foundations of Privacy: The Legacy of Lochner  
 
The legal history of abortion jurisprudence has been considered to be both highly 
contentious and textually inconsistent. Furthermore, the right to an abortion is largely 
hinged on the problematic right to privacy. I argue this contingency essentially 
orchestrates an unstable foundation for the subsequent right to an abortion and largely 
compromises its future legitimacy in constitutional jurisprudence. (Johnson and 
Alexander, 2003, 2) As identified by numerous legal scholars, the right to an abortion as 
established in Roe has been increasingly dismantled through inconsistent judicial 
decisions and aggressive abortion regulations since its inception in 1973. (Howard, 1993, 
10)  
To truly understand the parameters of the current abortion debate, it is important 
to first lay the historical foundation and legal underpinnings of the concept of the right to 
an abortion. For this reason, I will begin with a discussion on the judicial formulation and 
construction process of the right to privacy. This detailed and systematic analysis 
approach will be helpful in shedding some light on the underlying facets and distinct 
elements largely contributing to the instability manifested within current abortion 
jurisprudence.  
 23 
I assert that through an in-depth synthesis of each case detailing the evolution of 
the right to privacy, it is evident that textual ambiguity and substantive due process logic 
culminate to significantly destabilize the right to privacy. (Garfield, 1986, 17) With a 
highly problematic and unstable right to privacy assembled by the Court, this then creates 
an insecure foundation for the right to an abortion. (Johnson and Alexander, 2003, 5)  
 The legal construction of the right to privacy is a multi-faceted, complex and 
highly unstable concept that was fabricated utilizing the substantive due process clause. 
(Conkle, 1987, 2) This utilization of substantive due process has prompted a flurry of 
contestation by legal and non-legal scholars alike. (Chlapowski, 1991, 2) It is evident that 
the usage of the substantive due process clause from the Fourteenth Amendment has left 
the door open for criticism of judicial subjectivity and legitimacy. Additionally, the use 
of this doctrine has also created a risky situation in which judicial ambivalence coupled 
with foundational ambiguity in case law has precipitated an inconsistent right to privacy. 
I argue that an unstable right to privacy solely upholding the right to an abortion is 
problematic and leads to a lessened degree of legitimacy in modern law. (Wimberly, 
2007, 15-16) 
 The Lochner v. New York case of 1905 essentially disabled a New York statute, 
which placed a cap on the amount of hours worked by bakers to sixty hours per week. 
(Koehlinger, 1990, 5) In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that “the right to make a contract 
to purchase or sell labor” was inherently embedded within the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. (Garfield, 1986, 2) Justice Peckham, in writing the opinion of 
the court, specifically rendered the New York statue as having “no reasonable ground for 
interfering with the liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the 
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hours of labor, in the occupation of a baker.” (Lochner v. New York 1905) Here, the 
Court made a distinctive effort to clarify that the intent and objective of the law was to 
regulate occupation hours, without a legislative agenda to safeguard the health and 
welfare of employees. (Conkle, 1987, 2-3) 
 Although there was a textual recognition by the majority of the Court that 
categorized this statute as an inherent invasion of the employee’s liberty of contract, the 
Court did not expressively purport that this connotation of “liberty” was directly 
applicable or fundamental to the right of the individual. (Garfield, 1986, 2-3) As 
demonstrated throughout privacy case law, the net result and legal consequence of this 
landmark case was first the construction of highly ambiguous terminology relating to the 
fundamental rights of the individual. Secondly, the application of “special due process 
protection for liberty of contract” has been drastically expanded and manipulated to 
include privacy rights. (Garfield, 1986, 3)  
 This problematic element of the usage of due process from the Fourteenth 
Amendment in relation to fundamental rights and the subsequent reversal of the statute 
was explicitly noted in the dissent of Lochner. Justice Holmes recognized the inherent 
danger when the utilization of “the word ‘liberty,’ in the 14th Amendment, is perverted 
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.” (Lochner v. New 
York 1905) Here, his assertion was predicated on the Court’s seemingly arbitrary 
expansion and definitional construction of the term “liberty” to encompass the implicit 
rights of the individual in economic matters. In other words, the contention regarding the 
ruling in this case centers on an unwarranted extension of the applicability of the due 
process clause. (Garfield, 1986, 4) Additionally, scholars also argue that this is based on 
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the subjective opinions and views of the Supreme Court justices on suitable economic 
policy. (Bernstein, 2005, 12) 
 Justice Holmes’ apprehensive message regarding the Court’s broad interpretation 
of liberty touched on the larger issue of judicial subjectivity in the determination of 
contentious Supreme Court cases. (Grano, 2000, 8) As demonstrated in his dissent, 
Holmes made the valid assertion that “various decisions of this court that state 
constitutions and state laws may regulate life in many ways… which, equally with this, 
interfere with the liberty to contract,” such as Sunday laws, school laws and archaic usury 
laws. (Lochner v. New York 1905) In contrast, the ruling in Lochner emphasized a new, 
emergent infringement of the fundamental rights of citizens stemming from judicial 
subjectivity that has lived on to characterize Supreme court cases during the Lochner Era. 
(Grano, 2000, 9) It was during this span of time that the Court largely invalidated 
economic regulations and restrictions that inhibited liberty of contract. (Chlapowski, 
1991, 2) This initial recognition of judicial subjectivity by Justice Holmes speaks to the 
legitimacy and future stability of privacy case rulings in that justices’ “agreement or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in 
law.” (Lochner v. New York 1905)  
Through the latter analysis of privacy and abortion case law in this thesis, I argue 
that this judicial subjectivity coupled with contradictory case rulings over the years has 
essentially buttressed a foundation of instability upon which right to an abortion lies. 
(Garfield, 1990, 3) Furthermore, this implicit subjectivity of the justices and politicization 
of the Court has played a significant role in the formulation of the concept of judicial 
ambivalence. (Wimberly, 2007, 8) 
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 Similar cautionary messages were also evident and heavily echoed in the dissent 
of Justice Harlan.  He began by delineating the appropriate/proper arenas for judicial 
activity and legislative authority: “Whether or not this be wise legislation it is not the 
province of the court to inquire. Under our systems of government the courts are not 
concerned with the wisdom or policy of legislation.” (Lochner v. New York 1905) Here, 
Justice Harlan touched on a major theme prevalent throughout privacy and latter abortion 
case law. He argued that judicial decisions relating to the right to privacy and the 
fundamental implications on individual liberty are severely unstable due in part to its 
striking resemblance to judicial activism. (Grano, 2000, 7-8) Given the overwhelming 
contestation and disapproval of the Court’s affinity for overstepping judicial boundaries 
in civil liberties case law, this further serves to destabilize and uproot the validity and 
legitimacy of the right to privacy. (Tushnet, 1987, 2-3) 
In fact, numerous legal scholars have come to coin the Lochner Era of Supreme 
Court cases as an “era of judicial activism.” (Chlapowski, 1991, 3) As Justice Harlan 
explicitly asserted, the primary function of the Supreme Court is to make a valid, justified 
determination if the law or statute in question is essentially in “conflict with the 14th 
Amendment, without enlarging the scope of the amendment far beyond its original 
purpose.” (Lochner v. New York 1905) In other words, by expanding “constitutional 
protections to the realm of economic affairs” and domestic policy arenas, this is a vivid 
example of judicial activism. Additionally, scholars argue that this expansion is a risky 
encroachment into the dominion of political and legislative authorities, which assume a 
varying amount of accountability to constituents, unlike the lifetime appointed Supreme 
Court justices. (Chlapowski, 1991, 3-4)  
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In Lochner, Justice Harlan vociferously maintained that the proper battling and 
decision-making arena for this case, and others like it, is within the legislative realm of 
the government. (Grano, 2000, 8) He argued that “a decision that the New York statute is 
void under the 14th Amendment will, in [my] opinion, involve consequences of a far-
reaching and mischievous character.” (Lochner v. New York 1905) In this rather critical 
statement, Justice Harlan made a prescient observation about the problematic nature of 
the utilization of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He pointed to its 
substantial flaws through its manipulation to procure the subsequent right to privacy in 
American law. (Lochner v. New York 1905) 
The concept of substantive due process, as formulated in Lochner, is textually 
derived from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States 
Constitution: “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.” (U.S. Const. art. VII, § 4, cl. 1) In combination with the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment, it essentially safeguards and protects “‘liberty’ from 
unwarranted governmental interference.” (Chlapowski, 1991, 2) This legal concept 
principally encompasses a combination of basic procedural rights, as well as the 
defending a set of substantive rights. (Garfield, 1986, 2) Incorporated within the 
substantive section are those rights dealing with both liberty and autonomy of the 
individual, especially those deemed to be fundamental. (Koehlinger, 1990, 6) Through 
the application of this legal theory, the Supreme Court is not only able to allocate special 
protection to certain liberties of the individual via judicial discretion, but also 
controversially expand the scope and power of judicial review. (Chlapowski, 1991, 3) 
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 The power of expansion that is inherent within the substantive due process clause 
rests upon a two-tier foundation. The first tier is the incorporation doctrine, which 
permits the Supreme Court to implement and adopt detailed provisions that would apply 
to states under the due process clause. (Wimberly, 2007, 2) In other words, this theory 
asserts that many of the constitutional amendments (particularly the Bill of Rights) are in 
essence incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
(Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 469) Although the majority of the Court has never outright 
accepted this concept, there has been a significant amount of discussion on the distinction 
between “selective incorporation” and “total incorporation.” (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 
469)  
 One of the most prominent articulations on the idea of selective incorporation can 
be found in Palko v. Connecticut (1937). The case revolved around a federal court re-trial 
rendering a first-degree murder conviction for Palko and the incorporation of the Fifth 
Amendment to protect against double jeopardy. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 470) Justice 
Cardoza, in his deliverance of the majority opinion, asserted that “[The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects those rights which are] of the very essence 
of a scheme of ordered liberty.” (Vogel, 2007, 2) Here, Cardoza crafted an approach that 
delineates “fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our 
civil and political institutions” from those which do not deserve this higher level of 
protection. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 470) He concluded that certain rights, including 
the double jeopardy guarantee contested in the case, do not meet these outlined 
requirements and adding to the concept of selective incorporation. (Vogel, 2007, 2-3) 
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 In contrast, the idea of total incorporation as articulated by Justice Black refrains 
from this method of rights categorization as espoused by Justice Cardoza in Palko. In 
Adamson v. California (ten years after Palko), Cardoza’s incorporation approach proved 
to be more favorable in the eyes of the Court than Justice Black’s formulation within the 
dissent. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 469) Justice Black argued that the full and total 
incorporation of all of the Bill of Rights was set out as an “original purpose” of 
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 470)  
In addition to his description of the concept of total incorporation, Justice Black 
transitioned into the second section of his dissent with an inherent warning. He asserted 
the innate danger and “consequences of the Court’s practice of substituting its own 
concepts of decency and fundamental justice…and enforcing that [as part of the] Bill of 
Rights,” which is a severe departure from the essential function of the Supreme Court. 
(Palko v. Connecticut 1937) Within this passage, Justice Black also conceived of the vast 
implications that the “literal application of some or all of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights to the States would unwisely increase the sum total powers of this Court to 
invalidate state legislation.” (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 471) Again, this emphasizes 
the problematic nature of the use of substantive due process in procedural law given its 
capacity to not only controversially expand the realm of judicial discretion, but also to 
equip the Court with a legalistic mechanism to usurp power from the legislature.  
The second tier of substantive due process is the fundamental rights theory. This 
theory states the Supreme Court can safeguard and dispense increased protections for 
fundamental rights, without a dependence on textual justification explicitly listed within 
the U.S. Constitution. (Wimberly, 2007, 6) As previously discussed, Justice Cardoza also 
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played a significant role in molding and formulating this concept inherent within his 
majority opinion in Palko. His rather elusive depiction of fundamental rights and 
liberties, which deserve increased protection, in practice, enables the Supreme Court to 
apply strict scrutiny. With a standard of review involving strict scrutiny, numerous 
governmental actions deemed to burden the exercise of those rights could thus be 
invalidated. (Vogel, 2007, 4)  
These rights, which are deemed fundamental by the Court, are not only 
ambiguous in nature, but also their textual base of justification has frequently shifted 
between three textual sources in the Constitution: “the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause” with a recent re-emergence 
within the due process clause. (Vogel, 2007, 5) I argue that this contentious combination 
of ambiguous, undefined terms of liberty with a failure on the part of the Court to 
substantiate a legitimate foundation has demonstrated the fundamental rights theory to be 
a risky endeavor at best. (Wimberly, 2007, 3) Coupled with a highly debated and largely 
unsettled incorporation theory, I assert that the implementation of the substantive due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the primary grounding for the right to 
privacy has proved problematic. As other scholars agree, the Court’s use of this 
discredited doctrine has been instrumental in the construction of a highly unstable 
foundation that undermines the legal legitimacy of the right to an abortion. (Tribe, 1990, 
92-93)  
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B. Transitions to Reproductive Privacy: Is Griswold a Revival of Lochner? 
 
 
 Griswold v. Connecticut is considered by many legal scholars to be the 
fundamental case that textually substantiated the right to privacy as applied to the 
reproductive sector of law. (Tribe, 1990, 94) The background of the case involved an 
Executive Director from the Planned Parenthood League and a licensed physician from 
the Yale Medical School. Both individuals “gave information, instruction, and medical 
advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception.” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut 1965) According to two provisions under Connecticut state law, these 
actions undertaken by both professionals were in found to be in violation and 
subsequently punishable by a $100 fine. (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) 
 Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the court. He specifically highlighted the 
existence of “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights [that] have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees…and create zones of privacy.” (Griswold v. 
Connecticut 1965) The Court determined that the constitutionality of the Connecticut 
statute, which prohibited the distribution of information regarding means of 
contraception, was fallacious in criminalizing this action. (Wimberly, 2007, 7) In the eyes 
of the Court, this case provided the fitting situation in which to textually construct and 
establish the right to reproductive privacy using the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. (Johnson and Alexander, 2003, 3)  
 As demonstrated in the case law, the decision by the majority to utilize “Lochner 
[as the] guide” has incited a firestorm of controversy not only among critical legal 
scholars, but also more vividly within the precincts of the Supreme Court. (Griswold v. 
 32 
Connecticut 1965) Given the vast contestation regarding the use of substantive due 
process rationale, the Court instead refrained from relying too heavily on invoking 
language of Lochner to legitimize their decision in Griswold. (Chlapowski, 1991, 3) 
Instead, the majority in Griswold appears to supplement and almost attempt to disguise 
their use of substantive due process by significantly modifying an incorporationist 
approach to privacy. (Zampa, 1990, 3)  
The Court argued that the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of Rights 
(particularly the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendment) fundamentally 
produce a zone of privacy specifically for married persons. (Garfield, 1986, 5) The Court 
essentially attempted to theoretically depart from Lochner, but at the same time utilized 
the substantive due process doctrine to ground the concept of reproductive liberty and 
privacy. (Wimberly, 2007, 8) As other scholars agree, I argue that this attempt proves to 
be fairly unconvincing and actually destabilizes the grounding of privacy in law. (Zampa, 
1990, 3) With the Court’s use of this discredited doctrine coupled with an ambiguous 
depiction of the textual location of this unenumerated right to privacy, I assert that this 
significantly weakens the stability and subsequent legitimacy of the right to an abortion. 
(Chlapowski, 1991, 3) 
 This interpretive approach by Justice Douglas has been identified to be 
problematic for several reasons. First, the Lochner method of employing substantive due 
process frames the concept of liberty, as derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause. (Koehlinger, 1990, 2) With liberty viewed as fundamental to the 
individual, these rights then require and oblige an increased degree of judicial scrutiny to 
governmental actions that would be interpreted to infringe on this type of liberty. 
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(Chlapowski, 1991, 3) In other words, through the usage of substantive due process in 
civil liberties cases, justices are enabled to insert subjective, personal opinions regarding 
their ideas of appropriate laws, which manifests in the increased degree of protection for 
rights they deem “fundamental.” (Zampa, 1990, 3)  
As Kadlec notes, this judicial subjectivity is further entrenched in Griswold 
because the substantive due process doctrine is structured in such a way that it is 
essentially an all-or-nothing approach in rights protection. The problem here is that 
because this doctrine lacks solid, established parameters regarding the specific criteria 
that labels a right fundamental, the justices are allowed free reign in their decision-
making process. (Kadlec, 2007, 8) Similarly, Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 
which is incorporated by reference into his Griswold concurrence, also highlights this 
problem. He stated “Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot 
be determined by reference to any code.” (Poe v. Ullman 1961) Justice Harlan clearly 
hinted at the difficulty in sufficiently justifying the invocation of substantive due process 
in order to establish fundamental rights protection in law. In a similar vein, Wimberly 
also notes that the problematic, subjective nature of the Court’s use of substantive due 
process in Griswold largely contributes to their ambiguous basis for decision-making. 
(2007, 9) I argue that this lack of objective, consistent standards further undermines and 
complicates reproductive privacy law.   
Despite clearly stating that they do not assume a “super-legislature” position, the 
Court in Griswold still struck down the Connecticut statute without providing a textually 
substantiated basis for their decision. (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) Rather, the Court 
legitimized their claim by acknowledging the existence of “sacred precincts of marital 
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bedrooms,” which implies an area exempt from governmental intrusion (Wimberly, 2007, 
9-10) Because substantive due process safeguards “those liberties that are deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition,” the Court is virtually granted the capacity to define 
fundamental rights based on personal ideology and preserve traditional values by 
enshrining them in constitutional law. (Conkle, 1987, 5)   
Justice Black, within his dissent, distinguished the danger of judicial subjectivity 
and argued in the same vein. He stated “that [the Lochner] formula, based on subjective 
considerations of ‘natural justice’ is no less dangerous when used to enforce this Court’s 
view about personal rights.” (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) As Justice Black noted, the 
central problem here is that a newly constructed right, such as the subsequent right to an 
abortion, is founded upon this unstable principle. (Garfield, 1986, 6) This foundational 
dependency creates a situation, in which this right is subject to fluctuation in legality with 
shifting social norms. Additionally, it also renders state legislatures incapable of creating 
laws and regulations that would satisfy the degree of judicial scrutiny to attain 
constitutionality. (Zampa, 1990, 3-4) I argue that this implicit subjectivity on the part of 
the Court under the shroud of substantive due process has contributed to the instability 
and challenged legitimacy of the right to privacy.  
 Another problematic element associated with the use of substantive due process in 
Griswold is the manner by which the Court essentially supercedes the confines of judicial 
review. (Kadlec, 2007, 9) Legal scholars subscribing to a strict constructivist school of 
thought argue that the Supreme Court is held as an objective, legal arm of the 
government. (Garfield, 1986, 5) Due to the Court’s active role in carving out a right of 
reproductive privacy with little to substantiate their logic, many legal analysts argue that 
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the Court in Griswold failed to even slightly adhere to the textual confines of the U.S. 
Constitution. (Basiak, 2005, 5) The Court’s actions in Griswold are highly reminiscent of 
the Lochner Court’s aggressive engagement in judicial activism through their use of 
substantive due process to invalidate much economic federal and state legislation. 
(Borgmann, 2006, 5-6) As many scholars agree, the Court’s inherent revival of 
Lochnerian analysis has prompted both increased legal scrutiny and has called into 
question the legitimacy of the Court’s decision in Griswold. (Krotoszynski, 2002, 3) I 
argue that this pervasive legal contestation of the Court’s decision-making faculties in 
Griswold actually destabilizes and weakens the right to reproductive privacy in law.  
 It is important to clarify and define the type of judicial activism discussed by the 
justices in their respective dissents. Judicial activism, in and of itself, is not inherently 
negative depending on how one view’s the primary role of the Supreme Court. 
(Bernstein, 2005, 18-19) Yet, in respect to Griswold, both Justice Black and Justice 
Stewart are wary of the brand of Lochnerian judicial activism that expands the power of 
the Court. Particularly, Justice Black argued that it is not the proper role of the Court “to 
invalidate any legislative acts which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or 
offensive.” (Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) I assert that this largely discredited form of 
judicial activism, as noted by Justice Black, significantly compromises the institutional 
integrity of the Court, which trickles down to seriously impact the legitimacy of this right 
to reproductive privacy.  
Borgmann and other scholars assert that claims of inappropriate judicial activism 
in Griswold are essentially two-fold. First, the Court essentially constructs subjective 
rights that are not explicitly enumerated in the text of the Constitution. Secondly, the 
 36 
Court largely alters or completely strikes down long-standing federal statutes with little to 
substantiate their decision. (2006, 12-13) As Justice Black later articulated, the central 
criticism of utilizing substantive due process is that “the power to make such decisions is 
of course that of a legislative body” and not within the jurisdiction of the Court. 
(Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) I argue that Lochner’s past of notoriously invalidating 
legislation still appears to haunt modern day judicial opinions, as well as spark criticism 
regarding the capacity of substantive due process to open the door for overly assertive 
judicial activism.  
 In his dissent, Justice Black also touched on another highly problematic issue 
within the Griswold decision. He highlighted the troublesome nature of the Court’s use of 
textually ambiguous terms and noted the subsequent definitional struggles in Griswold. 
(Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 553) As Wimberly and other scholars note, it appears the 
majority has engaged the Due Process clause, coupled with the penumbras of the Bill of 
Rights, for a strategic advantage. (2007, 8-9) By using language encompassing freedom 
and liberty as well as its capacity to “nationalize” this newly established right to privacy 
to all state governments, this tactic by the Court seems to have created a highly scattered 
and convoluted decision. (Johnson and Alexander, 2003, 3-4) Justice Black stated that the 
term “privacy is a broad, abstract and ambiguous concept…[and] can easily be 
interpreted as a constitutional ban against many things other than searches and seizures.” 
(Griswold v. Connecticut 1965) Here, there is an emphasis on the definitional flexibility 
and open-textured nature of the concept of privacy, which largely highlights its 
vulnerability to subsequent changes and alterations of meaning in later case law. 
(Wimberly, 2007, 9) With an already ambiguous, unremunerated term of privacy, I assert 
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that this lays the foundation for instability given its impermanent nature and poses further 
textual problems for the Court given the lack of clarity in grounding this term.  
This difficulty of both elaborating and grounding the existence of privacy in 
Griswold, as articulated by Justice Black, increasingly exacerbates an already highly 
divisive and fragmented Court. (Smolin, 1992, 25-26) This ambiguity is not only 
prevalent in the terminology used to clarify the right, but also on a methodological level. 
(Moore, 1989, 9-10) After a careful review of the case law, I argue that the strenuous 
struggle by the Court to develop a firm, legally grounded foundation for the right to 
privacy proves to be largely unsuccessful. This is greatly exemplified by the varying and 
radically differing opinions, concurrences and dissents launched by other members of the 
Court.  
The legal rationale for solidifying this right in modern constitutional law ranges 
from the highly abstract penumbras and emanations theory described by Justice Douglas 
to a subtle underlying existence of implied privacy within the Ninth Amendment as 
depicted by Justice Goldberg. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 547-548) Coupled with the 
concept of liberty stemming from the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
these vastly different interpretations of where the unenumerated right to privacy lies 
creates as significant amount of confusion in the jurisprudence. (Gottlieb, 1989, 5-6) 
There are even justices, primarily Justice Black and Justice Stewart in dissenting, that 
virtually object to all the constitutionally unbased claims of privacy by other members of 
the Court. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 552-553) I argue that the blatant lack of judicial 
consensus on the foundation for privacy as a legal right, in addition to textual and 
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methodological ambiguity, appears to generate a significant degree of ambivalence 
among the Court justices. (Zampa, 1990, 3)  
This judicial ambivalence in Griswold is mainly evidenced by several components 
in the case law. As legal scholars note, these components include: the divisiveness of the 
opinion of the Court, the disjointed nature of the legal rationale, the inability to come to a 
consensus on both the existence and application of privacy. In addition, the striking 
criticisms regarding lack of textual support for the decision of the Court and the apparent 
apprehension to deliver a legally binding decision based on the discredited, Lochner 
version of substantive due process also exemplifies some form of judicial ambivalence. 
(Garfield, 1986, 5) With these elements culminating in the Griswold decision, I argue that 
the criticized illegitimacy of the Court as an objective institution filters down to manifest 
in a largely unstable and challenged right to privacy. This consequently is a highly 
weakened foundation for the right to an abortion and significantly contributes to its 
volatility and uncertainty in modern law.  
Over the years, many legal scholars have identified the landmark Griswold v. 
Connecticut case of 1965 as the untimely revival of Lochner. (Garfield, 1986, 4) The 
biting stigma associated with Lochnerian substantive due process usage is further 
buttressed by terminological and methodological ambiguity. Consequently, these 
elements have produced a largely fragmented and divided Supreme Court. (Smolin, 1992, 
25-26) It appears the ambivalence of the Court has hindered the provision of clear and 
sufficient parameters for the scope of the right to reproductive privacy. The Court’s 
failure to bring an adequate level of clarity to their decision in Griswold has significantly 
contributed to the instability and wavering legitimacy of privacy as a constitutional right. 
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(Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 556) Furthermore, scholars argue that accusations of 
judicial subjectivity leading to the illegitimate usurpation of the role of the legislation 
have added another dimension of the contentiousness of this decision. (Garfield, 1986, 2)  
Legal analysts, such as Zampa and Wimberly, have been vocal within the 
literature asserting that this aggressive brand of judicial review has significantly 
politicized and jeopardized the Supreme Court’s validity and legal legitimacy. (Zampa, 
1990, 3-4) I assert a more pertinent implication lies in that fact that the ambiguity and 
difficulty in substantiating privacy has had over-arching effects on the subsequent right to 
an abortion. I argue that the textual and legal instability of the right to privacy has been 
perpetuated by the Court to latter reproductive privacy cases and has consequently 
weakened the legitimacy of abortion.  
 
 
C. Formal Articulation of a Right to an Abortion: Roe v. Wade    
 
 
Roe v. Wade is the groundbreaking Supreme Court decision that essentially struck 
down a Texas abortion law, which criminalized the procurement of an abortion except 
“by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.” (Roe v. Wade 1973) 
As many scholars point out, this was not the first time the Court assumed an active role 
on a civil liberty issue and engaged in judicial policy-making (i.e. Griswold). (Zampa, 
1990, 3) Yet, it did signify an expansion and broadening of the scope of liberty and 
privacy to a woman’s right to elect to terminate her pregnancy. (Garfield, 1986, 7) As 
demonstrated in Griswold, the grounding of such a contentious heated issue was far from 
simplistic. As scholars note, the Court again seemed to struggle with clarifying it’s legal 
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rationale and stabilizing it’s textual legitimacy for the right to an abortion. (Gottlieb, 
1988, 11) As demonstrated in the case law, I assert that the Court’s repeated reliance on 
the problematic substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment continues 
to breed instability and subsequent illegitimacy in reproductive privacy jurisprudence. 
(Borgmann, 2006, 13) 
The majority of the Court, with Justice Blackmun delivering the opinion, 
commenced with an acknowledgement of the historical nature of abortion. Through this 
analysis dating from the “Persian Empire abortifacients” to modern “American law,” the 
Court established the historical acceptability of abortion as a medical procedure. 
(Koehlinger, 1990, 11) With this historical perspective in place, Justice Blackmun 
initiated another textual grappling match with the unenumerated right to privacy.  
After citing previous relevant case law in his synthesis of the actual foundation of 
the right to privacy, Justice Black concluded:  
“…whether it be founded in the 14th Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty [as] we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the [Ninth 
Amendment], is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
or not to terminate her pregnancy.” (Roe v. Wade 1973) 
 
As Garfield points out, this one decisive sentence illustrates that not only did the Court 
finally concede and recognize that the right to privacy is a substantive due process right, 
but also that it is applicable to the right to an abortion. (1986, 6-7)  
The significance here is that abortion, as it is determined to be implicit to a 
person’s ordered liberty, is deemed fundamental and requires extra protection on the part 
of the Supreme Court. (Borgmann, 2006, 5) As a fundamental right, the burden is thus 
placed upon the shoulders of legislature to craft regulations that are “justified only by a 
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compelling state interest” in order to limit this right. Additionally, Justice Blackmun 
stated that regulations “must be narrowly drawn” in order to pass the strict judicial 
scrutiny reserved for fundamental rights. (Roe v. Wade 1973) The concern expressed by 
many legal scholars is that by categorizing the right to an abortion as both a fundamental 
right and a substantive due process right, the Court obscures the functionality of the 
American legal system as a whole. (Chalpowski, 1991, 3) In other words, the Court’s use 
of the problematic substantive due process doctrine to frame the right to an abortion as 
fundamental enables them to disrupt the structure of the legal system by usurping 
authority from the legislature. (Wimberly, 2007, 8-9) With the capacity to illegitimately 
enact over-arching judicial legislation under the mask of substantive due process, I argue 
that the Court essentially renders the legislature incapacitated with stringent judicial 
standards. (Zampa, 1990, 4) Thus, I assert that the Court constructs an unstable and 
ambiguous platform for the right to an abortion, which is furthermore demonstrated by 
the implementation of the trimester framework. 
 The trimester framework formulated and enacted in Roe has still left many legal 
scholars scratching their heads over its legal rationale. The majority of the Court in Roe 
began by delineating and articulating the legal distinctions between viable and non-viable 
fetuses. (Adkins, 2005, 5) Without speculating or delving into the semantic snake pit that 
characterizes the debate about when life begins, the Court focused on when viability (the 
ability of a fetus to survive outside the mother’s womb without any artificial aid) is 
achieved during gestation. (Farrell, 1993, 31) By drawing on medical and biological 
literature, the Court determined “viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 
weeks).” (Roe v. Wade 1973) The importance of this time increment centers on when the 
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state’s compelling interests to preserve potential life come into play, which has serious 
ramifications for establishing a cohesive and legitimate framework. (Zampa, 1990, 3) I 
argue that the trimester framework is inherently problematic because of the advancement 
in pre-natal technology and definitional variability in clearly defining “viability.”  
 The actual trimester framework is structured around three identifiable state 
interests that the Court considers compelling. (Zampa, 1990, 3-4) From conception up 
until the end of the first trimester, the decision to abort a pregnancy is considered not 
significantly life threatening to maternal health. Thus, during the first trimester the Court 
allocated full decisive power to the woman and her “attending physician.” (Roe v. Wade 
1973) In the second trimester, the Court has determined that the State may intervene to 
regulate the abortion procedure “in promoting its interest in the health of the mother.” 
(Roe v. Wade 1973) In the third trimester once viability has been established, the State’s 
compelling interest in protecting potential human life is considered primary. (Adkins, 
2005, 5-6) The Court essentially permits the State to erect regulations and provisions 
restricting abortion except in the case when the mother’s life/health is compromised by 
the burden of the pregnancy. (Garfield, 1986, 7)  
 As evidenced by the construction of the trimester framework, the Court made it 
textually clear that the fetus is not a legal person while in utero. (Tribe, 1990, 115-116) 
The majority of the Court again felt the need to clear up lingering ambiguity regarding 
the terms “person” and “right to life” centrally embedded within the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Garfield, 1986, 7-8) After thorough review of the contextual 
nature of these terms, the Court concluded that “the use of the word is such that it has 
application only postnatally.” (Roe v. Wade 1973) Interestingly, Garfield asserts that the 
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progression of fetal rights, as manifested through the State as an agent of claim in the 
latter stages of pregnancy, seems to increase parallel to the fetus’ physical maturation. 
(1986, 7-8) This inherent conceptualization of “fetal rights as growing over time” by the 
Court makes abortion regulation laws inconsistent with other forms of law. (Garfield, 
1986, 8) In essence, the formula developed by the Court in Roe conceded that the 
fundamental right to privacy outweighs the State’s interest in protecting fetal rights 
insofar that the fetus is a dependent entity. (Solinger, 1998, 96-97) 
 Through the enactment of the trimester framework, I argue that the Court 
essentially differentiated three, distinct phases during pregnancy without definitive 
medical certainty. In Roe, the Court again failed to sufficiently substantiate their legal 
rationale and justification for actively extending the right to privacy to encompass a right 
to an abortion. (Howard, 1993, 4) As Justice White noted, “the Court simply fashions and 
announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason 
or authority for its action…to override most existing state abortion statutes.” (Roe v. 
Wade 1973) I argue that this form of unwarranted judicial activism and policy-making by 
the Court in Roe severely undermines and weakens the legitimacy of the right to an 
abortion. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 565) 
 As demonstrated in the Griswold decision, the majority in Roe is again criticized 
for their heavy reliance on the doctrine of substantive due process due to the legislative 
freedom it grants the Court. (Adkins, 2005, 26) This stigma is revisited in the Roe 
decision and best articulated by Justice White in stating “in my view [the majority’s] 
judgment an improvident and extravagant exercise of the [raw] power of judicial review.” 
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(Roe v. Wade 1973) This statement greatly illustrates one of the main, problematic facets 
of utilizing the substantive due process analysis as a foundational justification.  
Justice White touched on the fact that a substantive due process analysis 
orchestrates a difficult situation, in which the judicial branch subverts the authority of the 
legislative branch. (Garfield, 1986, 2-3) The negative implication here is that the 
Supreme Court is ill-equipped to engage in policy-making given their supposed neutrality 
from the political realm and the nature of their selection/appointment process essentially 
renders them immune to substantial constituent liability. (Zampa, 1990, 4) As Justice 
White clearly warned, the Court is treading on dangerous ground by “constitutionally 
disentitling” the legislature to perform their appointed duties. (Roe v. Wade 1973) I argue 
that continuation of the Court’s engagement with judicial activism in sensitive 
reproductive privacy cases fully hinders the democratic process and generates instability 
for the right to an abortion when established in this manner. (Wimberly, 2007, 8)  
Another negative outcome of grounding Roe using substantive due process is that 
judicial legislating severs the legislative branch from fulfilling it’s duties at set out by our 
American system of government. Scholars agree, that it significantly undermines the 
federal legislature as a successful, equally vital arm of the government. Additionally, it 
also deprives the State legislatures from engaging in experimentation in appropriate 
policy arenas to develop a more socially acceptable solution to the abortion issue. 
(Zampa, 1990, 4-5) It is only through large-scale trial and error on the part of the states 
that seems to be a more suitable realm to deal with inherent social welfare issues of the 
public citizenry. By sending the issue back to the people of the states as Justice White 
suggested, this would allow the highly complex issues entrenched within the right to an 
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abortion to be more effectively reviewed in a proper forum. (Garfield, 1986, 7-8) Legal 
scholars argue that it would thus create the democratic opportunity for a sufficiently clear 
formulation to be derived in union with the varying social values of the local constituents 
in each state. (Zampa, 1990, 5)  
By nationally mandating judicial policy inherently legislative in nature under 
substantive due process, Zampa asserts that the Court severely emasculates the beneficial 
role that state legislatures would play in developing a better, fine-tuned solution to the 
abortion issue locally. (1990, 5) As Zampa continues, the Court’s usurpation of authority 
from local, legislative institutions also perpetuates the controversy and contention 
surrounding abortion given the lack of a nationwide consensus. (1990, 6) Through the 
Court’s actions as a super-legislature in this case, the people are left incapable of playing 
a role in resolving the issue on a state level given the broad spectrum of differing 
opinions on the topic. (Garfield, 1986, 12) The absence of a national consensus on the 
issue of abortion (or even a consensus among the members of the Supreme Court) has 
been problematic for adequately legitimizing the right to an abortion in society. 
Additionally, I find the Court’s illegitimate use of substantive due process has fanned the 
fires of dissent among the American people, which has triggered continuous conflict (in 
the form of legal challenges) between the states and the Court for essentially violating the 
core principles of federalism. (Zampa, 1990, 4) 
Given the lack of sufficient clarity within the majority’s rational analysis of the 
biological structure of pregnancy, this has essentially left the door open for legal criticism 
by those unwilling to accept substantive due process logic. (Garfield, 1986, 7) According 
to the logic of the Roe decision, the right to an abortion is fully contingent on the 
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existence of a right to privacy, which I argue poses the greatest risk to the stability of a 
legal abortion right. With a highly fragmented Court produced by the Griswold decision 
in their construction of a right to privacy, the convoluted judicial rhetoric and unclear 
textual legal principles substantiated by the Court in Roe are equally divisive. (Howard, 
1993, 4) I assert that the Court again struggled with textually clarifying principles and 
terms that provide the primary constructs of the trimester framework, which further 
destabilizes the legitimacy of reproductive privacy. 
Furthermore, scholars also argue that the viability testing standard is somewhat 
convoluted in its relation to constitutional rooted principles and the Court’s justification 
is again fraught with the same textual ambiguity as seen in Griswold. (Farrell, 1993, 14-
15) I argue that this divisiveness over both the decision and founding rationale essentially 
renders the Court in a fractured state, which perpetuates a failure to adequately clarify 
these concepts. By imparting an over-arching national standard on such a complex, 
contentious issue, the Court further raises eyebrows by engaging in judicial policymaking 
without an established consensus (either by the Court or public). (Zampa, 1990, 4) This 
Lochnerian brand of judicial activism not only weakens the legitimacy of the Court as a 
legal interpretative body, but also imbues the right to an abortion with instable 
foundational groundwork. (Moore, 1989, 2) Thus, I assert that with a highly unstable and 
disputed right to privacy supporting subsequent reproductive rights, the right to an 
abortion is largely compromised and weakened as a legal right.   
As demonstrated in my discussion of the Court’s formal articulation of 
reproductive privacy and a right to an abortion, the judiciary has struggled to provide a 
cohesive foundation and clear definition/meaning for the right to privacy. Additionally, 
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this lack of legal clarity has transferred to the right to an abortion in Roe. (Zampa, 1990, 
4) As legal scholars note, it appears the most ambiguous piece of this puzzle is the 
elusive right to privacy, given its shadowy existential existence in the penumbras and 
emanations of the Bill of Rights. (Garfield, 1986, 5-6) With an inability to clearly and 
legitimately ground these rights within historical, constitutionally sound legal principles, 
I argue that the Court in both Griswold and Roe has essentially perpetuated this 
problematic tradition of judicial ambivalence and textual ambiguity. As legal scholars 
agree, the pervasiveness of textual ambiguity in the case law appears to be one of the 
problematic elements that prompt ambivalence from the justices to maintain Roe’s 
convoluted framework. (Zampa, 1990, 4-5)  
 As I have argued thus far, textual ambiguity has primarily arisen from convoluted 
logic, lack of Constitutional grounding, equivocal terms and associated meanings 
espoused by the Court. (Garfield, 1986, 7-8) Similarly, judicial ambivalence emanates 
from lack of a Court consensus, engagement in unwarranted judicial legislating and 
activism, lessened perceived legal legitimacy and the sheer contentiousness among 
members of the Court on the rationale of the decision in Roe. (Farrell, 1993, 9) Yet, it 
appears a third equally significant element further compounds the situation: substantive 
due process. (Smolin, 1992, 18)  
As demonstrated in both Griswold and Roe, the usage of the substantive due process 
doctrine as a sufficient means for legally grounding not only the right to privacy, but also 
the right to abortion drastically destabilizes these rights in the eyes of many legal 
scholars. As Garfield argues, with the “ghost of Lochner” still attached to privacy and 
abortion jurisprudence, the Court’s apparent affinity for enacting judicial legislation 
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within the reproductive rights realm has severely weakened the legitimacy of both the 
right to privacy and right to an abortion. (Garfield, 1986, 17) I argue this instability in 
reproductive privacy law imposes serious ramifications on future attempts at constructing 
a pragmatic approach to grounding these rights in a domestically legitimate manner.  
 
 
 
D. Regulation of Abortion: The Akron and Thornburgh Cases 
 
 
The next reproductive cases to be analyzed within this section are the legal 
challenges launched by critics in response to the establishment of the right to an abortion 
in Roe. During the period between Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (1992), a backlash against the right to an abortion occurred in 
both American society and the political/legislative arena. This strong reaction forced the 
Court to re-examine not only the parameters, but also the structural integrity of the 
trimester framework. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 572) During this time period, the state 
legislatures also waged a staunch and perpetual battle against the Supreme Court’s 
legislation in Roe by challenging the extent of state abortion regulations. (Tribe, 1990, 
126-127) This multi-faceted backlash has resulted in the following Supreme Court 
decisions that not only re-evaluate the finite meaning in Roe, but also mark the shift in 
standard that furthers the perennial debate on the legitimacy of the right to an abortion. 
(Zampa, 1990, 6)  
 Although other cases had reached the Court prior to City of Akron v. Akron Center 
of Reproductive Health (1983) such as Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth (1976) and Belloti v. Baird (1976), the significance of Akron is that it indicated 
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the actual departure from employing the “unduly burdensome” standard and a 
considerable modification to the trimester framework. (Zampa, 1990, 6) As legal scholars 
note, this shift suggests that the legal rationale and logic initially espoused by the Court to 
justify their decision in Roe contains serious problematic facets such as ambiguous terms 
and largely undefined textual connections. (Mangel, 1988, 3-4) I argue that shifting legal 
logic and wavering case law standards exemplified in reproductive jurisprudence 
following Roe further demonstrates the illegitimacy and convoluted nature of the Court’s 
decision. I assert that the unclear and largely uncertain parameters erected by the Court 
following Roe exhibits the difficulty in sufficiently clarifying the textual ambiguity 
inherent within the Court’s previous decisions. (Howard, 1993, 4) The Court’s 
subsequent inability to overcome the equivocal nature of Griswold and Roe is 
demonstrated through a failure to provide a clear/consistent framework and indicates the 
deep rootedness of the instability as emphasized within my hypothesis.  
 The “unduly burdensome” standard, as applied in Danforth, was primarily utilized 
as a guide in administering the trimester approach to abortion regulations. (Zampa, 1990, 
5) The standard refers to the concept that the State, in its attempts to regulate the 
procedures of abortion, may not erect regulations that constitute a substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s ability to choose to abort. (Howard, 1993, 6) In the particular case of 
Danforth, the undue burden standard was applied to a Missouri law that was broadly 
aimed at regulating abortion by requiring a written consent of the patient, her spouse, and 
a parent or guardian if the patient was a minor. (Zampa, 1990, 5)   
Through the Court’s application of strict scrutiny to the State statutes in their 
determination of a compelling state interest to regulate abortion, they found that both the 
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spousal and parental consent provisions did prove to potentially inhibit a women’s ability 
to decide. (Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth 1976) On the other 
hand, the Court upheld regulations that dealt with patient written consent and physician 
reporting requirements. I argue that this highlights the variability and inconsistency of the 
Court’s standard of review. (Zampa, 1990, 5-6) As scholars note, the definitional problem 
here is that regulations that are “burdensome” are permissible, but regulations that are 
“unduly burdensome” are considered unconstitutional. (Annas, 2007, 202) I assert that 
this unclear, variability in definition further convolutes the jurisprudence with the Court’s 
failure to sufficiently clarify the criteria that bumps regulations into the “unduly 
burdensome” category.  
The lack of clarity is exemplified by the fact that the State can erect regulations 
(in the name of promoting potential life) requiring physicians to offer “detailed and 
accurate information on abortion, the status of the fetus, adoption, sources of help for 
childbirth, a 24 hour waiting period” as long as it does not significantly interfere or 
prevent women from making a independent judgment. (Annas, 2007, 202) With a distinct 
degree of ambiguity, coupled with the Court’s failure to provide lucid guidelines in what 
constitutes the term “unduly,” the Court began distancing itself from utilizing this 
standard because of its lack of clarity. (Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth 1976) Instead of devising a more clear and coherent testing standard, the Court 
instead reframes this convoluted test in terms of a more medical standard. (Prieto, 1984, 
2-3) I argue that this shift further confuses the abortion jurisprudence and emphasizes the 
struggle of the Court to develop a clear, consistent framework that would increase the 
legitimacy of the right to an abortion. 
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In the City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1976) case, the 
Court again reviewed and analyzed State regulations in the form of a direct legal 
challenge to cripple the right of abortion. (Rhoden, 1986, 4) In particular, the state of 
Ohio constructed an ordinance, which requires abortions after the first trimester to be 
performed in a hospital and prohibits the physician from performing the abortion on an 
unmarried minor without the consent of her parents or a court order. Additionally, the 
provision obliges the physician to deliver a detailed status report on the development and 
status of the fetus and possible date of viability, necessitates a 24 hour waiting period, 
and requires that the physician dispose of the fetal remains in a “humane and sanitary 
manner.” (City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976) Justice Powell, 
in delivering the opinion of the Court, begins by acknowledging:  
 
“legislative responses to the Court's decision have required us on  
several occasions, and again today, to define the limits of a State's  
authority to regulate the performance of abortions.” (Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health 1976) 
 
The need for the Court to make this assertion suggests a serious, permeating fallacy in the 
original logic and textual justification of the Court in Roe. By the Court feeling 
compelled to continuously have to re-iterate and re-clarify its stance, I argue that this 
speaks to both the ambiguity of their decisions and the waning legitimacy of the right to 
an abortion. (Bridenhagen, 1984, 8) Nevertheless, the Court distinctly refrains from 
implementing the stare decisis doctrine, and instead reaffirms their decision in Roe.  
 The majority in Akron again assumed a legislative role in further affixing another 
dimension to the trimester framework, which again marks a shift in the stability of the 
legal rationale. (Bridenhagen, 1984, 7-8) As I have previously discussed, the Court has 
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experienced increasing pressure from State legislatures due to the imprecise nature of the 
requirements and parameters of the ability of legislation to regulate abortion in adherence 
to the Court’s mandated guidelines in Roe. (Zampa, 1990, 6) Thus, the majority’s search 
for clarity led them to decree that post first trimester regulations and  “state’s discretion 
to regulate on this basis does not, however, permit it to adopt abortion regulations that 
depart from accepted medical practice.” (Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 
1976) As Bridenhagen argues, the Court shifted the testing standard from a rational 
analysis of undue burden to a standard largely substantiated by modern medical 
knowledge of the biological factors in the stages of pregnancy. (1984, 2-3) 
 In essence, the Court engaged in another act of judicial legislation, in which the 
State is “obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to the 
period in the trimester during which its health interest will be furthered.” (Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health 1976) As Zampa argues, the issue here is that because 
abortion techniques and practices fail to parallel the specific trimesters during pregnancy, 
this requirement handed down by the majority has basically “fragmented the rigid 
trimester approach.” (Zampa, 1990, 6) This problem subsequently obscures the 
legislation framework laid out in Roe for State compliance in regulating abortion. In the 
same vein, Justice O’Connor noted another problematic issue regarding the inability of 
the Court to sufficiently address the biological nature of viability and pregnancy in her 
dissent. She stated that “without the necessary expertise or ability, courts must then 
pretend to act as science review boards and examine those legislative judgments.” (Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976)  
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 Additionally, I argue that the increasing ambiguity in reproductive privacy law is 
further compounded by the continuous changes made by the Court to supposed definitive 
standards and guidelines in Roe. As Zampa notes, the majority again invoked the 
problematic substantive due process doctrine to strike down regulations enacted by State 
legislatures the Court deemed “unnecessary.” (1990, 7) The Court asserted that it is 
essentially “unnecessary” for the “State to insist that only a physician is competent to 
[462 U.S. 416, 418] provide the information and counseling relevant to informed 
consent.” (Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976) Thus, the Court 
invalidated Ohio’s informed consent and 24-hour waiting period regulations without 
demonstrating the existence of a serious impediment within these provisions that 
negatively impact a women’s ability to decide. (Bridenhagen, 1984, 7) As exemplified in 
the Griswold case, I argue that the use of the substantive due process permits the Court to 
blatantly engage in not only subjective decision-making, but also judicial policy-making 
with the application of strict scrutiny to such regulations.   
 Another troubling element presented in this case deals with the shift from a 
rationality standard to one that is increasingly medicalized. (Mangel, 1988, 3-4) As many 
legal scholars point, the problem here is that by grounding the legal definition of 
“viability” in Roe as the point at which State interests in preserving potential life become 
realized, the Court virtually de-stabilizes the new standard of review. (Prieto, 1984, 6) In 
other words, as medical technology in the field of reproductive health evolves, these 
medical advances revolutionize the capacity for a premature fetus to exist independent of 
the mother. On the flipside, medical improvements in the reproductive sector also 
severely threaten the right to an abortion even in the first trimester. (Mangel, 1988, 4) As 
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Rhoden also asserts, the Roe trimester framework is crumbling due to the advancement of 
medical technology, which will eventually render the viability schema obsolete. (1986, 
21) 
As a result, it becomes possible to push viability back into the early stages of the 
first trimester. I argue this would virtually subvert the right of women to elect an 
abortion, given the ability of State’s to ascertain legislative power in demonstrating 
viability under the guise of compelling interests. (Prieto, 1984, 5) As clearly articulated 
by Justice O’Connor in her dissent in Akron, it is “reasonable to believe that fetal 
viability in the first trimester of pregnancy may be possible in the not too distant future.” 
(Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976) Justice O’Connor clearly 
illustrated the future danger in shifting to a largely undefined medical standard in 
reproductive privacy cases. I argue that this transition to a medical standard, which 
scholars argue is already unstable and impermanent with advances in reproductive 
technology, further creates inconsistency and confusion within abortion jurisprudence. 
(Mangel, 1988, 12-13) Additionally, I believe that these continuous shifts in framework 
and logic destabilize the right to an abortion in law through the Court’s unsubstantiated 
vacillation in standards.  
As Justice O’Connor explicitly stated, “the Roe framework, then, is clearly on a 
collision course with itself” if the judiciary insists on utilizing substantive due process, 
constantly changing framework precedent, and clearly failing in providing a textual basis 
for unenumerated rights. (Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976) Within 
her dissent, she goes on to delineate the specific flaws and problems with continuing to 
use the trimester framework by the Court as a foundation to justify a right to an abortion. 
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She asserted that the framework, with all its varies problematic facets, is virtually an 
“unworkable means of balancing fundamental right[s] and compelling state interests.” 
(Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health 1976)  
Despite its obvious flaws, the Court still insisted on adhering to the underlying 
rationale of the trimester framework except with new minor revisions in each case. 
(Mangel, 1988, 12)  Through their unwillingness to forgo precedent and craft new 
rationality standards, the Court has maintained the façade and appearance of a “continuity 
of decision in constitutional questions,” as O’Connor noted. (Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health 1976) With such little consensus on the core logic and legal basis 
for the right to an abortion, I believe that this judicial unwillingness appears to be a 
manifestation of judicial ambivalence. It seems that the Court refrains from drastically 
altering precedent on the issue in order to not have to acknowledge fallacy within the 
original logic of the Roe Court. This apprehension of the majority may account for 
judicial abstinence in textually settling this complex area of law, which inversely has 
propagated more controversy and less legal stability for reproductive rights.  
A similar tone of uncertainty about the constitutionality of Roe was also expressed 
in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1986) several 
years later. In this particular case, the Court again applied strict scrutiny to two provisions 
of Pennsylvania’s Abortion Control Act, which specifically regulated informed consent 
and printed information in relation to abortion. (Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1986) Although the Court did refrain from invoking the 
problematic “unduly burdensome” standard, it did however essentially utilize the stark 
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anti-abortion sentiment within legislation as a new testing standard. (Sullivan and 
Gunther, 2004, 569) 
Justice Blackmun, in delivering the opinion of the Court, used the increasing 
amount of legal challenges in the realm of abortion regulation to decree that “States are 
not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health…to intimidate women into 
continuing pregnancies.” (Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists 1986) As many legal scholar note, with this important statement the Court 
essentially constructed a straw man argument by asserting that the States intent is not to 
purely protect the mother’s health and well being. (Zampa, 1990, 7) Instead, the Court 
argued that States aim to strictly regulate the practices of abortion and enact legislation 
that mirrors the sentiment of their constituents. (Zampa, 1990, 8) In addressing the 
legislature of Pennsylvania, the Court claimed that a prohibitory “effort to deter a woman 
from making a decision that, with her physician, is hers to make” is not acceptable 
according to abortion precedent. The Court goes on to essentially portray the legislature’s 
attempts at abortion regulation as illegitimate by “wholly subordinat[ing] constitutional 
privacy interests” of the woman. (Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists 1986)  
By again invoking the doctrine of substantive due process, coupled with applied 
strict scrutiny, the Court struck down both provisions. (Zampa, 1990, 8) The first 
provision dealt with informed consent, which was subjectively analyzed and interpreted 
to inhibit the ability of a woman to choose. The second provision required attending 
physicians to record the basis for determining non-viability and the woman’s age, race, 
marital status, and previous pregnancies. (Allen, 1992, 2-3) As Allen notes, the Court has 
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skewed and obscured the issue to actually oblige States to construct regulations that 
refrain from persuading women to look into other options. Thus, the Court largely 
invalidated the provisions for not demonstrating a legitimate state purpose in protecting 
maternal health. As Justice Burger noted, “the Court astonishingly goes so far as to say 
that the State may not even require that a woman contemplating an abortion be provided 
with accurate medical information concerning the risks.” (Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1986) I argue that the Court stringent and 
unclear standard of evaluating anti-abortion intent suggests judicial subjectivity in the 
invalidation of these State regulations, given the lack of a concise, constitutionally 
derived standard.  
Other dissenting justices in Thornburgh joined in, further fragmenting and 
dividing the Court on the issue. Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, asserted that 
“this venture has been fundamentally misguided since its inception” and furthermore the 
legal rationale has been increasingly “depart[ing] from a proper understanding of the 
Constitution.” (Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
1986) The dissenting justices also highlighted the problematic nature of the utilization of 
substantive due process given its open-textured character. They argued that the “Court 
engages not in constitutional interpretation, but in the unrestrained imposition of its own 
extraconstitutional value preferences.” (Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists 1986) As directly noted by Justice White and Rehnquist, the Court’s 
largely unprincipled invalidation of numerous State regulations since Roe has further 
undermined the stability of the right to an abortion. Additionally, I argue that the Court’s 
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overt, illegitimate use of judicial power and inconsistent establishment of imprecise 
standards further fragment the right to abortion in constitutional jurisprudence.  
 
 
E. Re-Affirmation and Modification of Roe: The Webster Case 
 
 
Three years later, yet another reproductive rights case reaches the Court, in which 
they drastically alter their judicial approach. Again, the Court’s shift signals another 
transition in abortion case law history. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) 
marks the end of a Lochner-esque era of abortion jurisprudence and the departure from 
employing substantive due process under the trimester framework developed in Roe. 
(Zampa, 1990, 9) For many scholars, it also indicated the textual compromise of the right 
to an abortion under the protection of Roe. (Allen, 1992, 4-5) 
The Webster case specifically dealt with the constitutionality of four provisions 
under a Missouri statute aimed at regulating abortion. The provisions included: the 
preamble, the ban on using public facilities and/or employees to perform an abortion, the 
prohibition on public funding for abortion counseling, and the obligation on attending 
physicians to conduct viability testing as a prerequisite to performing an abortion. (Allen, 
1992, 1-2) Instead of analyzing the aggregate effect of the entire statute upon the 
women’s ability to make an independent decision, the majority (headed by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist) deconstructed the statute into its elements. Under this approach, they 
reviewed each provision as distinct components and determined the constitutionality on 
an incremental basis. (Gunther and Sullivan, 2004, 573) Additionally, the Court also 
refrained from engaging in a Thornburgh analysis by not textually searching for an anti-
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abortion intent from the legislators to base their decision. (Zampa, 1990, 10) This shift to 
a textual analysis on an individual basis was not the only manner by which the Court 
would part from past methods in abortion case law review. 
 The Court began in Webster by synthesizing the constructs of the Preamble of the 
Missouri law, which asserted that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception, 
and that unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and wellbeing.” 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) Within the Akron dictum, the Court 
mandated that “a State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its 
regulation of abortions.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) In delivering 
the opinion of the Court, Justice Rehnquist asserted that this dictum is in fact being 
applied too broadly to abortion regulating legislation. (Bopp and Coleson, 1989, 4-5) 
Here, Justice Rehnquist made the point that a State could not “justify any abortion 
regulation otherwise invalid under Roe v. Wade on the ground that it embodied the State's 
view about when life begins.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989)  
Since the preamble failed to meet the criteria to fall under the Akron dictum 
because it does not regulate any aspect of the medical procedure of abortion, the plurality 
of the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s holding. (Zampa, 1990, 10) This determination 
subsequently allowed the Court to uphold the preamble on the grounds that it was simply 
a value judgment on the part of the State and did not conflict with Roe’s statement that “a 
State may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions.” 
(Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 573) I argue these systematic contradictory messages from 
the Court further convolute abortion jurisprudence and entrench an ambiguous meaning 
to the right to an abortion.  
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The significance in both Akron and Thornburgh is that the Court relied heavily 
upon an anti-abortion intent, which legitimized the usage of a strict scrutiny analysis in 
their evaluation of the constitutionality of abortion regulating provision. (Gray Jan, 1990, 
9) This demonstrated another considerable shift in the Court’s level of analysis, which 
suggests a varying degree of instability and lack of continuity on judicial decision-
making. I argue that this vacillation in applicable scrutiny standards greatly risks the 
legitimacy of past precedent in abortion jurisprudence and stability of future reproductive 
case law.   
In contrast, Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented 
and argued in Webster that the preamble did in fact violate the Court’s previous holdings 
on abortion precedent. (Zampa, 1990, 10) He asserted that “by the preamble's specific 
terms, these declarations apply to all of Missouri's laws which are to be interpreted to 
protect the rights of the unborn.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) In 
other words, the State’s textual expression of interest in protecting fetal life sheds light on 
the inherent aims of the State to unravel the right of women to choose. Specifically, 
scholars argue that these provisions are essentially targeted at undermining the woman’s 
scope of reproductive privacy, which subsequently encompasses contraceptive usage 
(such as the “morning after pill”). (Bopp and Coleson, 1989, 4-5) I argue that this re-
emergence of the definitional struggles previously encountered by the Court is evidenced 
by the varying degree of interpretation of the inherent meaning of State’s legislative aims. 
With the Court’s divisiveness and perpetual non-consensus on the abortion issue, I assert 
that this adds yet another layer of textual ambiguity and complexity to an already 
confused body of abortion jurisprudence precedent.  
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In the plurality’s review of the second and third provisions regarding the 
prohibition on the use of public facilities/employees in performing abortion and public-
funded abortion counseling, they also reversed the findings by the lower court of appeals. 
(Jan Gray, 1990, 2-3) The Court justified upholding the Missouri provision of  
“recognizing that a government's decision to favor childbirth over abortion through the 
allocation of public funds does not violate Roe v. Wade” and thus “confer no affirmative 
right to governmental aid” under a Due Process framework analysis. (Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services 1989) Once again, the plurality argued that the value 
judgment of the State to promote childbirth did not foreclose or significantly impact the 
availability of abortion. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 573) As scholars note, the Court 
asserted that this implementation of public-funding restriction policy favoring childbirth 
as a valued alternative did not affect it’s constitutionality under the Roe precedent. 
(Grant, 1989, 2-3)  
The plurality’s decision on this provision was also found to contain serious 
fallacies by the dissenting justices. Justice Blackmun, within his dissent, pointed out the 
lack of continuity within the plurality’s use of previous abortion precedent. He argued 
that there is a real difference between this current case and other abortion funding cases 
of the past. (Grant, 1989, 5) Justice Blackmun asserted that the Missouri provision has 
“taken affirmative steps to assure that abortions are not performed by private physicians 
in private institutions.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) As Justice 
Blackmun further articulated, this is accomplished through another manipulatory and 
interpretive maneuver by the State in defining the term “public.”  
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As Justice Blackmun continued in his dissent in Webster, he argued that “by 
defining as public every health care institution with some connection to the State,” this 
inevitably brings to “bear the full force of its economic power and control over essential 
facilities.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) As Zampa also notes, with 
this reclassification of public facilities as those with some tie to the State, the access and 
availability of abortion is thus greatly narrowed. (1990, 11) As displayed in my previous 
discussion, the Court again struggled in both clearly interpreting and delineating terms in 
the abortion debate with an increased lack of clarity. As scholars agree, I thus argue that 
this failure to provide lucidity in the Court’s decision further contributes to the overall 
ambiguity in abortion jurisprudence and creates increased difficulty for States to craft 
policy with such indefinite/highly disputed guidelines. (Grant, 1989, 5) 
Perhaps the most divisive provision in the Missouri statute dealt with the 
viability-testing requirement, which presented the most direct challenge to the trimester 
framework constructed in Roe. (Zampa, 1990, 12) The viability testing provision 
provided that:   
“Before a physician performs an abortion on a woman he has reason to 
believe is carrying an unborn child of twenty or more weeks gestational 
age, the physician shall first determine if the unborn child is viable by 
using and exercising that degree of care, skill, and proficiency 
commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful, and prudent 
physician engaged in similar practice under the same or similar 
conditions. In making this determination of viability, the physician shall 
perform or cause to be performed such medical examinations and tests 
as are necessary to make a finding of the gestational age, weight, and 
lung maturity of the unborn child and shall enter such findings and 
determination of viability in the medical record of the mother” 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989)  
 
The first matter the Court examined in determining the constitutionality was when 
exactly and in what circumstance these tests would be directly applied. The plurality 
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determined that the lower Court of Appeals had “fallen into plain error” in their statutory 
interpretation within their assertion that the second sentence mandated the actual tests. 
(Zampa, 1990, 12) In contrast, the Court found that the “second sentence is read to 
require only those tests that are useful to making subsidiary findings as to viability.” 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) In other words, the plurality stated that 
by interpreting the second sentence to mandate viability testing in all circumstances, even 
when the physician’s “judgment indicates that the tests would be irrelevant to 
determining viability or even dangerous to the mother and the fetus,” this would be in 
direct conflict with the requirements of the first sentence. (Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services 1989)  
 With the interpretation of the provision intended to further the State’s interest in 
potential life by requiring only those tests to be conducted for the purpose of determining 
viability, the Court then proceeded to systematically analyze the provision’s applicability 
to the matter of abortion. (Grant, 1989, 2-3) The Court, particularly Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in writing the opinion, began with a bitter criticism on the core structure in 
Roe.  He regarded the “key elements of the [rigid] Roe framework -- trimesters and 
viability – [as] not found in the text of the Constitution.” (Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services 1989) I argue that this staunch, increasingly disapproval of Roe 
embedded in the following Supreme Court decisions hinders the legitimacy of the right to 
an abortion. Additionally, I assert that these criticisms also serve to increase the 
divisiveness among the justices and further thwart any chance of the Court to enunciate a 
clear/solid framework to stabilize Roe.  
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 The plurality commenced their analysis by recognizing that under the precedent 
of Roe, State’s were allocated increasingly power of intervention and abortion regulation 
after the first trimester. This authority also increased after the State demonstrated a 
legitimate and compelling interest in fetal life. (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
1989) With this established, the Court then proceeded with detailing the specific conflict 
between the methods in viability determination within the Missouri provision and their 
prior decision in Coluatti v. Franklin (1979). (Zampa, 1990, 12) In Coluatti, the Court 
held that “the determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a 
matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.” (Coluatti v. Franklin 
1979) As Zampa argued, the conflict was thus contingent on whom and what agency has 
the authority to proscribe the use of viability testing and the specific determinant of when 
the State has a compelling interest in the life of the fetus. (1990, 12)  
 The plurality determined that “to the extent that [the Missouri provision] regulates 
the method for determining viability, it undoubtedly does superimpose state regulation on 
the medical determination whether a particular fetus is viable,” which evidenced a 
conflict with judicial precedent. (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) Yet, 
instead of invalidating the Missouri provision based on this precedent conflict, the 
plurality engaged in a discussion of the Roe trimester framework and the legal fallacies 
that have subsequently de-stabilized the right to an abortion. (Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services 1989) 
  The Court posited that the current amount of legal contestation and legislative 
attacks regarding the right to an abortion is a “reflection of the fact that the rigid trimester 
analysis of the course of a pregnancy enunciated in Roe” has buttressed the convoluted 
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nature of abortion jurisprudence. (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) As the 
Court continued, this abortion case law confusion in constitutional law is further 
evidenced given that the “result has been a web of legal rules that have become 
increasingly intricate, resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of 
constitutional doctrine.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) This total and 
utter disapproval of Roe eventually led the Court to conclude in pragmatically severing 
ties with the trimester framework.  
With the Court’s increasing loss of faith in the rigid trimester framework as a 
“method of constitutional analysis,” the plurality instituted a modified rationality 
standard in place of the framework established in Roe. It was under this new standard that 
the viability testing was “permissible” and thus upheld. (Zampa, 1990, 13) The Court also 
made a point that it would cease applying strict scrutiny under the discredited and 
problematic substantive due process doctrine from Lochner. In Webster, the Rehnquist 
Court’s acknowledgement of both textual ambiguity and problematic legal rationale 
inherent in Roe marked a significant milestone. (Allen, 1992, 8) I argue that this 
recognition of the flawed nature of Roe provokes the Court to be ambivalent in further 
maintaining this problematic ruling. This judicial ambivalence leads to an apprehension 
to appropriately clarifying the right to an abortion, which largely compromises its 
legitimacy in law. 
Although Justice O’Connor concurred with the plurality’s decision, she still 
fought for the continued use of the undue burden test (also articulated in her dissent in 
Akron). (Johnson and Alexander, 2003, 5) Instead of subscribing to Justice Rehnquist’s 
legal reasoning behind upholding the viability testing, O’Connor asserted that the 
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plurality’s reasoning would ultimately lead to the overturning of Roe. She argued that 
“there is no necessity to accept the State's invitation to reexamine the constitutional 
validity of Roe v. Wade.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) In place of 
interpreting the provision under the lens of a modified rationality test, Justice O’Connor 
found that the “performance of examinations and tests useful to determining whether a 
fetus is viable…does not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision.” 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) She concurred with the plurality’s 
decision in keeping with her use of the undue burden test. (Grant, 1989, 2) I argue that 
this exemplifies the considerable variance of applicable testing standards promoted by 
different members of the judiciary. As Chlapowski notes, it also suggests a consistent and 
systematic non-consensus on the leading precedent in these cases and on an inability to 
settle on a single standard for future cases that would help to clarify this complicated area 
of law. (1991, 4)  
Justice Blackmun’s aggressive dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennen, 
essentially accused the plurality of creating further instability and volatility within 
abortion jurisprudence. (Zampa, 1990, 14) In Webster, he asserted that the plurality 
constructed a point of contention resting on viability and “exaggerat[ed] the conflict 
between [the Missouri provision’s] untenable construction” and the Roe framework. 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) Ultimately, Justice Blackmun asserted 
that this has “precipitat[ed] a constitutional crisis.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health 
Services 1989) Through their creation of this conflicting situation between precedents, 
Justice Blackmun claimed that the Court had essentially overturned Roe in an unofficial 
capacity by discarding the trimester framework as “unworkable.” (Zampa, 1990, 14)  
 67 
Justice Blackmun continued by arguing that the Court has skirted the true 
jurisprudential issue on “whether the Constitution includes an ‘unenumerated’ general 
right to privacy as recognized in many of our decisions…and to what extent, such a right 
to privacy extends to matters of childbearing.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
1989) As Zampa notes, the Court instead criticized and argued that several of the core 
elements found to be supporting the trimester framework are not textually found in the 
Constitution. (1990, 13-14) Although the plurality went on to state that under this 
approach “countless constitutional doctrines” would fail, Justice Blackmun argued that 
this is a rather inconsistent allegation. He points to the plentiful amount of other prior 
judicial decisions essentially constructing rights that are largely unenumerated in the 
actually body of the Constitution. (Zampa, 1990, 14) Through the Court’s engagement in 
balancing individual rights with competing State interests, Justice Blackmun concluded 
that judicial analysis “lies at the very heart of constitutional adjudication…in defin[ing] 
the scope of constitutional rights” in relation to the complex matters of procreation. 
(Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989)  
Justice Blackmun’s synthesis on truly discerning the internal problematic facets 
embedded within abortion jurisprudence significantly highlights the fact that they are 
often contrived by the Court’s convoluted interpretation and legal reasoning. I argue that 
the Court’s confused and often contradictory rulings further contribute to the perpetual 
controversy surrounding this issue. Justice Blackmun argued that the opinion contained 
“not one word of rationale for its view of the State's interest,” largely resulting in a “it-is- 
so because we say so jurisprudence.” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) 
Here, Justice Blackmun hits the nail right on the head. I assert that this lack of substantial 
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legal basis for the judiciary’s abortion decisions calls into question the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Court’s overall use of judicial power.  
In keeping with the Court’s history of overstepping judicial boundaries through 
it’s engagement in policy-making and legislating in reproductive privacy cases, I argue 
that the plurality of the Court has again failed to provide a comprehensive testing 
standard in abortion jurisprudence. Additionally, the Court has again failed in delivering 
a clear contextual explanation on when this testing standard is applicable. (Zampa, 1990, 
15) The plurality in Webster has also struggled in interpreting and redefining terms (such 
as “viability”) with sufficient clarity. In addition, the Court has also failed in providing 
clear textual foundations for their use of a new “modified” rationality standard. Through 
the Court’s inability to provide clear-cur definitions and adequately legitimize their 
drastic transition in testing standard, I argue that the Court has further contributed to the 
textual ambiguity of this area of law. As Zampa notes, this lack of clear guidelines further 
frustrates State’s attempts at crafting compliant abortion regulating provisions that would 
withstand changing judicial review. (1990, 15)  
 
 
F. A Swift Departure from Roe: Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
 
 
With inconsistent, changing standards of review (substantive due process in 
Griswold, fundamental rights analysis in Roe, a medical standard in Akron, then now an 
obscure modified rationality test in Webster), I argue that the Court’s actions have thus 
far propagated an unstable, textually ambiguous, highly fragmented right to an abortion 
in modern jurisprudence. Although Webster did not serve as the last word on the 
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perennial abortion debate, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey (1992) is 
still categorized as one of the most muddled and confusing decisions the Court has 
handed down on the abortion issue. (Howard, 1993, 12) As other scholars note, the Court 
again shifted to establish a confusing, problematic framework to ground the right to an 
abortion. (Wharton, Frietsche, and Kolbert, 2006, 25) In Casey, I argue that the Court 
against shifts the standard of review and delivers another highly fragmented decision that 
further compromises any future existence of domestic legitimacy of the right to an 
abortion in constitutional law.  
The methodological approach utilized in Casey by the joint opinion has been 
criticized for being not only contradictory and inconsistent in terms of its basis, but also 
problematic in its heavily reliance on the force of precedent. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 
587-588) The Court began by first engaging in a significant discourse on the current 
status and constitutionality of Roe’s underpinnings up to that point in abortion 
jurisprudence. Within this in-depth discussion by the Court, there is an inherent 
acknowledgement of the pervasive textual ambiguity in reproductive case law. 
(Schneider, 1993, 2) Additionally, the Court also implicitly recognized the presence of 
some degree of judicial ambivalence due to the contentiousness and disputed nature of 
the legal rationale upholding the right to an abortion. (Schneider, 1993, 2-3) Justice 
O’Connor clearly stated that 19 years after its inception, “Roe’s definition of liberty is 
still questioned” and challenged by legal experts and State legislators alike. (Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Nevertheless, the Court made it a point 
and declared that the central holding in Roe “should be retained and once again re-
affirmed.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) With this statement, 
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the Court set the stage to address the commonly launched criticisms aimed at 
destabilizing the right to an abortion.  
Instead of settling on one foundational principle under which to ground the right, 
the Court broke from reproductive tradition and took a different route in constructing a 
hybrid approach in establishing the constitutionality of Roe. (Howard, 1993, 7) The Court 
asserted that the “constitutional protection of the woman’s decision…derives from the 
Due Process Clause [with] the controlling word [being] ‘liberty.’” (Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Here, the Court made a pro-active effort to establish 
the moral and conceptual link from “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy” to 
the “centrality of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Following their exposition on the constitutional 
necessity to imbue this right with legal protection from arbitrary state intervention, the 
Court then discussed their stance on the stare decisis doctrine in reference to the legality 
of the right to an abortion. (Schneider, 1993, 6)  
As demonstrated in Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Webster, scholars argue that 
the split nature of the Court implicates an identifiable apprehension among Court justices 
to maintain and uphold the central legal underpinning in Roe’s logic. (Allen, 1992, 2-3) 
Varying Court members have engaged each other in rhetorical battle, which is most 
vividly depicted by the bitter exchanges between Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun 
in Webster. This stark disagreement suggests there is some inherent fallacy within the 
logic of Roe given the sheer amount of contentiousness among the members of the 
leading judicial body for the nation. (Schneider, 1993, 5) With this said, Justice 
O’Connor did make explicit reference to the “reservations any of us may have in 
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reaffirming the central holding of Roe,” which further suggests there is a dichotomous 
existence of judicial ambivalence. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 
1992)  
The dichotomous nature of judicial ambivalence, particularly in latter abortion 
jurisprudence, is two-fold. On one side, several members of the majority (including 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter) subscribe to the idea that “overruling Roe’s 
central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare 
decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise judicial power.” 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Here, the majority asserted that 
by overturning the legally-established precedent in Roe, this would not only acknowledge 
a serious error in prior judicial analysis, but would call into question the credibility and 
legitimacy of the Court to make over-arching decisions on such divisive issues. (Howard, 
1993, 7)  
The other side of the coin, as best articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, with 
whom Justice White, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join in dissenting, lies in a full 
belief that “Roe was wrongly decided” due to an apparent “emptiness of reasoned 
judgment.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Thus, they 
concluded that the framework is rendered unworkable and illegitimate. (Allen, 1992, 2-3) 
The invocation of stare decisis’ “unworkable” clause to overturn the right is necessary to 
prevent further manifestations of judicial ambivalence, given the flawed nature of the 
initial logic and perpetual non-consensus on the issue. (Schneider, 1993, 7) Additionally, 
the dissenting justices argued that the conceptualization of “liberty finds no refuge in a 
jurisprudence of doubt.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As 
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exemplified in both the joint opinion and dissent, judicial ambivalence regarding both the 
decision to either uphold or overrule and move on has significantly plagued the Court. 
(Moses, 2004, 4) I argue that this judicial indecision has essentially led to a stalemate 
situation, in which the right to an abortion is destined to remain contentious and 
convoluted in nature without any true consensus in order to make progress towards 
clarity. (Howard, 1993, 12) 
In Casey, the joint opinion thus concluded that “the promise of constancy” in case 
law rationale far outweighs the likelihood of stare decisis in this case. (Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) This statement led into the Court’s next 
section, which was their attempt to further clarify and re-define the parameters of Roe. 
Within the Court’s attempt to do so, Schneider asserts that the Court only adds yet 
another layer of complexity by arbitrarily selecting which elements to uphold and which 
to discard. (1993, 6) Howard and other scholars argue that this contributes to the overall 
lack of clarity and Court’s infamous “doublespeak.” (Howard, 1993, 5) The contradiction 
here is that while the joint opinion praises the survival of Roe, it virtually dismantled its 
core constructs leaving behind a framework so narrowly tailored that almost nothing can 
fit inside it.  
The Court continued in Casey by asserting that the woman’s liberty is not 
absolute, thus “the line should be drawn at viability,” so that before that point the woman 
is empowered with the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. (Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) The Court’s decision to adhere to the viability 
standard was firstly due to stare decisis, and secondly rested on the conceptualization of 
viability. (Wharton, Frietsche and Kolbert, 2006, 4-5) The joint opinion found that 
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viability is the most appropriate measure in mediating the rights of the woman and the 
power of the State in protecting fetal life. (Schneider, 1993, 7) Thus, the Court officially 
discarded the trimester framework constructed in Roe because it “misconceives the nature 
of the pregnant woman’s interest and undervalues the State’s interests in potential life.” 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) 
The Court then made another significant departure in Casey by rejecting the 
modified rationality test in Webster and, for all intensive purposes, resuscitating Justice 
O’Connor’s unduly burdensome standard. (Zampa, 1990, 14) This newly re-vamped test 
was adopted by the Court since they deemed the “undue burden standard [as] the 
appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally 
protected liberty.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) According to 
the Court in Casey, an undue burden is essentially imposed when a State regulation or 
provision “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  
The Court also made a point in their departure from applying strict scrutiny to all 
abortion regulations. (Cavendish, 2002, 2-3) Additionally, the Court emphasized that they 
would not textually analyze a regulation for an anti-abortion intent, thus “a state measure 
designed to persuade [a woman] to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld.” 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As Howard notes, the Court 
shifted again in their standard of review to a two-pronged test articulated by Justice 
O’Connor in previous case law. (1993, 10) The test consists of first determining whether 
the regulation imposes an “undue burden” on the woman, and second if there is no 
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evident undue burden, then the Court reverts to utilizing a rational basis review of the 
regulation. (Schneider, 1993, 7)  
As demonstrated in Webster, the joint opinion again conducted an individual 
analysis on each provision of the Pennsylvania statute. The Court began with the statute’s 
definition of medical emergency, in reference to its 24 hour waiting period regulation and 
informed consent requirement. (Sullivan and Gunther, 2004, 579) Under the 
Pennsylvania statute, a physician is required to inform the woman of the nature of the 
abortion procedure, the health risks associated with both abortion and childbirth, and the 
“probable gestational age of the unborn child” at least 24 hours prior to performing the 
abortion, with an exception for medical emergencies. (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Thus, an abortion may not be performed unless the 
woman signs a consent form indicating that she was informed about the risks, benefits, 
and given the option to review supplementary material on alternative choices. (Schneider, 
1993, 8)  
The joint opinion concluded that the mandatory 24 hour waiting period did not 
constitute an undue burden, given that the nature of the informational literature was non-
misleading and expressed truthful facts. (Metzger, 1994, 16-17) Although in reaching this 
conclusion, the Court did stumble on explicitly clarifying and denoting the difference 
between “particularly burdensome” and “unduly burdensome.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) By instituting a mandatory waiting period, this entailed 
making a first appointment to receive and review the information materials, and then 
making a second trip during which the abortion would be performed. (Howard, 1993, 6-
7) Even the lower district courts determined that instances of “trauma, delay and 
 75 
harassment” were demonstrated to be substantial obstacles, which the Court failed to 
address in their decision. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) 
Without clear, pragmatic and “conceptual boundaries” to this new standard of review, I 
argue that the Court has again produced an ambiguous and inconsistent standard that is 
vulnerable to judicial subjectivity. (Howard, 1993, 6)  
Additionally, it appears that for some women who are of limited, financial means 
or “have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others,” the 
24-hour waiting period is particularly burdensome. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pa. v. Casey 1992) But, the Court is quick to point out that “a particular burden is not of 
necessity a substantial obstacle.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 
1992) As Schneider notes, the serious implication here is that this loose definition of an 
“unduly burden” essentially proscribed abortion for poor women given the increased 
financial burden incurred from this requirement. (1993, 8) Furthermore, Schneider 
concludes that this requirement virtually invalidates the right to an abortion for some of 
the female population. Nevertheless, the joint opinion largely ignored and sidestepped the 
real consequences and life situations for a large part of society.  
The Court’s arbitrary conclusion that significant problems endured by poorer 
women do not substantiate an “undue burden” according to their definition is 
contradictory at best. (Howard, 1993, 6) While the Court heralded the enjoyment of this 
right to choose for many female generations to come, it will only be those select women 
with substantial financial means to actually utilize this right. (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) I argue that the unclear and impractical parameters of 
what constitutes an “undue burden” espoused in the Casey decision is both contradictory 
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and inconsistent. The Court again failed in providing a clear, contextual definition for 
their undue burden standard, which further contributes to the overall textual ambiguity of 
abortion jurisprudence and instability of this right.  
The joint opinion in Casey then considered the spousal notification requirement in 
the Pennsylvania statute, which provided that except in cases of medical emergency, “no 
physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman” without a signed statement 
indicating that she had informed her husband of her intent to pursue an abortion. 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) The provision also included an 
alternative (in light of marital violence) in the form of a signed statement by the woman 
“certifying that her husband is not the man who impregnated her” or that the pregnancy 
was the result of spousal sexual assault. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey 1992) The Court then engaged in a discussion regarding the increased incidence of 
physical and psychological violence towards women, particularly when the “mere 
notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and violence within the 
family.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  
The Court conceded that the spousal requirement “does not merely make 
abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain,” but it will impose a “substantial 
obstacle” and deter woman from pursuing an abortion when their life and personal safety 
is in jeopardy. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  Under the 
Court’s undue burden analysis, the provision significantly hindered a woman’s decision 
and was thus rendered unconstitutional. (Schneider, 1993, 8) Although the large majority 
of woman who seek abortions are unmarried and thus unaffected, the Court made it clear 
that “the proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a 
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restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As Howard notes, the Court failed to further clarify their 
degree of applicability of the undue burden test, in terms of how they go about measuring 
the extent by which a substantial obstacle impacts a population of women. (1993, 8) With 
a lack of concrete parameters and an inconsistent application standard, I argue that this 
further convolutes the functionality of the new standard and further compromises the 
legitimacy of the right to an abortion.  
In Casey, the Court then proceeded to analyze the two remaining provisions under 
the Pennsylvania regulation: parental consent and reporting requirements. (Wharton, 
Frietsche, and Kolbert, 2006, 7-8) The parental provision held that “except in a medical 
emergency, an unemancipated young woman under 18 may not obtain an abortion unless 
she and one of her parents provides informed consent.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Because this was an alternative to parental notification, 
the Court determined that the statute was not overly narrowly tailored and re-affirmed the 
provision. (Howard, 12, 1993) In the case of the reporting requirement, because the 
“identity of each woman who has had an abortion remains confidential,” and because the 
collection of information is a “vital element of medical research,” this provision did not 
pose an undue burden. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) The 
Court also upheld this provision, which marks the conclusion of the joint opinion.  
As noted by the dissenting justices and critics of the decision, the Casey opinion 
is not only fraught with contention and ambiguity, but also maintains the fragmented 
tradition of abortion jurisprudence in U.S. Constitutional law. (Howard, 1993, 10-11) As 
many scholars argue, the inherent and explicit flaws intertwined within the central 
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holding of the joint opinion has thus created the most challenged and problematic 
abortion precedent to date. (Gabel, 1998, 4-5) As best articulated by the justices in their 
dissents, they note that a significant degree of instability and unnecessary complexity lies 
within several factors. I argue that the lack of clarity, the subjective nature of the undue 
burden test, the production of contradictory holdings, the inconsistent reliance on district 
court's findings, and the dramatic shift in the burden of proof arising from a largely 
incongruent appropriation of scrutiny fundamentally changes the nature of Roe. (Howard, 
1993, 7) Furthermore, I argue that such monumental alterations and departures from the 
core legal reasoning in Roe not only dismantles the validity of the right to an abortion, 
but also severely cripples any lasting hope for the continued survival of this right. 
(Schneider, 1993, 12-13) 
In constructing and later implementing the undue burden test, the joint opinion 
asserted that increasing the level of clarity in abortion case law was one of the primary 
reasons for the substitution. (Howard, 1993, 8) Yet, it appeared the Court has instead 
further complicated the issue with a revival of textual ambiguity and a failure to convey 
finite definitions for their use of term. Additionally, the parameters of these terms and the 
degree to which they are inconsistent subsequently increase the imprecision of the Court 
to deliver clear decisions on the abortion issue. (Schneider, 1993, 9) A vivid example of 
this was the lack of a solid, comprehensive explanation on the conceptual and functional 
difference between “particularly burdensome and “unduly burdensome.” (Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As Justice Scalia argued in a similar 
vein, “its [joint opinion] efforts at clarification make clear only that the standard is 
inherently manipulable and will prove hopelessly unworkable in practice.” (Planned 
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  The implication here is that with a lack 
of clarification on a definitional level, this ultimately permeates into an applicable level 
demonstrated by an inability to render consistent rulings. (King, 2006, 5-6) I argue that 
the Court’s failure to develop a concrete standard in Casey and instead implementing a 
standard with a high level of interpretive flexibility, leads to contradictory holdings that 
further threaten the integrity of the right to an abortion.  
Within the Casey opinion, there are two identifiable contradictory holdings as 
pointed out by several legal scholars. Firstly, Howard asserts that the joint opinion 
essentially held that a State may attempt to “persuade” a woman from pursuing an 
abortion. But, a State may not place an “obstacle” before the woman seeking an abortion 
“if it was calculated to hinder the woman’s decision.” (Howard, 1993, 7) As best 
articulated by Justice Scalia, virtually any regulation of abortion that is “intended to 
advance what the joint opinion concedes is the State’s ‘substantial’ interest in protecting 
unborn life will be ‘calculated [to] hinder’ the woman’s decision to have an abortion.” 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Consequently, Justice Scalia 
deduced that a State may advance its goals of promoting childbirth over abortion “only so 
long as it is not too successful” in its pursuits. (Howard, 1993, 8) I argue that this internal 
level of inconsistency within the Court’s logic, as depicted within the dissents has 
severely weakened the applicability of the standard to subsequent abortion regulations. 
Additionally, the circular logic foundation constructed by the Court in Casey has also 
lessened the stability of the right to an abortion.  
The inconsistency implicated in the joint opinion’s holdings was further 
crystallized in their incompatible use of the district court’s findings within their judicial 
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analysis of the Pennsylvania provisions. (Howard, 1993, 7) In reference to the Court’s in-
depth discussion of spousal notification and the constitutionality of that provision, Justice 
Scalia noted that the joint opinion relied “extensively on the factual findings of the 
District Court, and repeatedly qualified its conclusions by noting that they are contingent 
upon the record developed in this case.” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. 
Casey 1992) With the many findings and factual data regarding the situation of battered 
women compiled by the district court, this proved to be supportive to the join opinion’s 
assertion that spousal notification was an undue burden. (Howard, 1993, 8)  
In contrast, the Court largely discounted and discarded the findings made by the 
district court regarding the 24-hour waiting period. (Burnett, 2007, 2-3) As portrayed in 
the case law, the district courts concluded that women having to account for their 
whereabouts made it “extremely difficult” for them to travel to the clinics and then have 
to return for a second time, 24 hours later for the procedure. (Howard, 1993, 8) As 
Schneider notes, the actual waiting period may not directly create an obstacle in terms of 
accessing abortion, yet it may be construed to constitute a “substantial obstacle” (as with 
spousal notification) given the relevancy and significant amount of women it impacts. 
(1993, 9)  
Nevertheless, the joint opinion arbitrarily rejected the district court’s findings for 
the 24 hour waiting period, which suggests a subjective tendency to “highlight certain 
facts in the record that apparently strike the three Justices as particularly significant in 
establishing (or refuting) the existence of an undue burden.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As Justice White added, “the undue burden 
standard…and the inherently standardless nature of this inquiry invites a district judge to 
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give effect to his personal preferences about abortion.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  I argue that such a wide degree of variance in 
terminology further compounds inconsistent holdings by the Court and calls into question 
the core legitimacy and workability of the undue burden test.  Consequently, I assert that 
the textual ambiguity of this undue burden standard increasingly destabilizes the right to 
an abortion by opening the floodgate for inappropriate, judicial subjectivity in abortion 
jurisprudence.  
The Court also embarked on another significant departure from Roe, in that it 
rejected the use of strict scrutiny and substituted a mere rational review. (Moses, 2004, 2-
3) As Schneider notes, by decreasing the scrutiny to a much lower level in abortion 
regulation cases, the Court virtually invalidates the fundamental liberty interest of the 
woman since only those rights deemed fundamental evoke increased judicial protections. 
(1993, 9) Within the Court’s discussion on the core constructs of balancing the interest of 
the State against the liberty interest of the woman, they isolated the phrase of the “State's 
important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life” from the 
Roe framework. (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) In doing so, 
the Court then determined that a strict scrutiny approach was an improper mode of 
analysis given their finite extraction and premature focus on the “legitimate interest,” 
without a fundamental acknowledgement of the contextual nature and rootedness in Roe. 
(Schneider, 1993, 10)  
This misinterpretation of Roe and subsequent adoption of a rational review test 
has resulted in prioritizing the State’s interests over the fundamental protection of the 
woman’s reproductive privacy established in Roe. (Wharton, Frietsche and Kolbert, 2006, 
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5-6) In effect, this tipping of the scale enables the State to demonstrate a compelling 
interest to trump the woman’s claim to reproductive, fundamental privacy even in the 
first trimester of pregnancy. (Schneider, 1993, 9) In contrast, the majority in Roe 
emphasized and centralized the necessity in applying a strict scrutiny analysis. Given the 
gravity in dealing with rights deemed fundamental to the personal liberty of the 
individual, the Roe Court found a lower level rational review to be inappropriate. (King, 
2001, 2-3) In Casey, the joint opinion largely departed from this valid logic and 
essentially manipulated the language and judicial rhetoric in Roe to fashion a standard, 
which would permit State regulations before the fetus had reached viability. (Schneider, 
1993, 10) By discarding the trimester framework and fundamental rights 
conceptualization central in Roe, the Court has drastically re-structured the logic to 
further buttress the legitimacy of their new undue burden standard. (Schneider, 1993, 11) 
I argue this re-formulation of logic posits serious implications for the constancy of a 
woman’s legal right to privacy and reproductive privacy.  
As Justice Blackmun asserted in Casey, “strict scrutiny of State limitations on 
reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of the woman’s right to make 
her own reproductive decisions, free from state coercion.” (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) Given the importance of defining and protecting 
individual liberty in modern jurisprudence, Schneider argues that the Court’s prior 
application of a strict scrutiny analysis accomplished several objectives. First, it defined 
the parameters within which the Court must examine actions of the state (eliminating the 
potential for judicial decisions to be anchored in “moral bias”). Also, it effectively 
safeguarded fundamental liberties “commensurate with the value we ascribe them,” and 
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discouraged States from peremptorily restricting rights deemed fundamental. (Schneider, 
1993, 11) As Howard adds, the value in implementing a strict scrutiny analysis in 
fundamental rights cases is central to the valid holding in Roe and would perpetuate a 
consistency in the judicial adjudication in abortion regulation review. (1993, 9) With the 
Court’s institution of a new, largely unworkable undue burden test in Casey, I argue that 
this essentially subverts the fundamental element in protecting a woman’s liberty interest 
in her own reproductive self-determination. Consequently, this reformatting of the 
Court’s standard of review also marks a shift in the burden of proof from the State to the 
bodily integrity of the woman.  
The standard established in Roe, as with other fundamental rights, charged the 
State with the burden of justifying its regulation of abortion as well as crafting provisions 
that would be narrowly tailored in order to satisfy the strict scrutiny in judicial review. 
(Schneider, 1993, 9) With the joint opinion’s virtual invalidation of a fundamental rights 
framework and rejection of a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court’s restructuring of the right 
to an abortion in Casey has vastly altered the burden of proof. Now, individuals 
challenging State regulations on abortion must demonstrate and prove the statute is 
“unduly burdensome” and, therefore unconstitutional (Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992) As noted by Justice Scalia, the problem here is that the 
undue burden standard is “not at all the generally applicable principle the joint opinion 
pretends it to be; rather, it is a unique concept created specially for this case.” (Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 1992)  
A clear, textual example of this was demonstrated in the fact that the Court found 
no evidence proving that the informed consent requirement was an undue burden, thus 
 84 
the judiciary upheld it. (Schneider, 1993, 11) The largely ambiguous and imprecise 
construction of what is considered to be “unduly burdensome,” (despite the sufficient 
findings of the district courts and demonstrated plight of financial dependent woman) was 
unable to prove that the 24-hour waiting period was an undue burden. (Burnett, 2007, 5-
6) Additionally, Howard notes that this textual ambiguity essentially overturns the right 
to an abortion for some woman, but further empowers the Court to inject their subjective 
predilections into the supposed objective nature of the rule of law. (1993, 8)  
As vociferously emphasized by both the dissenting justices in Casey and legal 
critics alike, the increased subjectivity that the undue burden standard creates is 
undeniable. (Schneider,1993, 8) As Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly articulated: 
 “In evaluating abortion regulations under [this] standard, judges will 
have to decide whether they place a ‘substantial obstacle’ in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion. Ante, at 34. In that this standard is 
based even more on a judge's subjective determinations than was the 
trimester framework, the standard will do nothing to prevent ‘judges 
from roaming at large in the constitutional field’ guided only by their 
personal views” (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey 
1992)  
 
Here, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out the overt flexibility entrenched within the new 
undue burden test. This not only entails the “amorphous standard of review” espoused by 
the joint opinion, but also severely compromises the constancy of the woman’s asserted 
right to an abortion even within the first trimester given the subjective nature in 
evaluating undue burden. (Schneider, 1993, 10)  
With the varying and changing interpretations of the undue burden 
conceptualization as conceived by Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy in past abortion 
regulation cases, the subjectivity recognized then has perpetuated into future judicial 
determinations. (Gabel, 1998, 1-2) With the demonstrated unworkability of the new 
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undue burden test coupled with a mere rational review, legal scholars extrapolate that 
future abortion regulations that approach the bench will largely be upheld and evoke 
increased contention due to the current divisiveness among the Court. (Howard, 1993, 
12) These speculations regarding the future legal status of the right to an abortion are 
most troubling and disconcerting from the standpoint of pro-choice advocates and pro-
choice legal feminists alike. (Mayeri, 2004, 4)   
 
 
 
G. A House of Cards: Results Analysis and Concluding Discussion 
 
 
The issue of a right to an abortion in American society still remains highly 
contentious in the both the legal and political realms. It was my primary intention within 
this thesis to disentangle and map out some problematic characteristics contributing to the 
instability evident in abortion jurisprudence. Thus, I argue that there has been a 
demonstrative manifestation of not only textual ambiguity in the reproductive privacy 
case law, but also a significant degree of judicial ambivalence arising from a failure to 
construct firm standards of review and concrete definitional parameters. Through a 
virtual non-adherence to precedent logic and fundamental case law holdings, the Court 
has further perpetuated and entrenched foundational instability within the legal rationale 
to ground this controversial right. With this evident instability and inconsistency in 
judicial adjudication, the abortion jurisprudence area of law largely remains unsettled, 
thus vulnerable to a further dismantling of the core construct established in Roe.  
This constraining trend identified within abortion jurisprudence has been further 
evidenced by the very recent decision in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), in which the Court 
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upheld the constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. This Act is 
primarily a third trimester procedure involving dilation and extraction of the fetus. 
(Burnett, 2007, 3-4) The Court upheld this provision on the grounds that the respondents 
have failed to prove that this Act “imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right to 
abortion based on its overbreadth or lack of a health exception.” (Gonzales v. Carhart 
2007) Although the analysis of this case would support the primary claim within this 
thesis, Carhart was not textually synthesized given its recent deliverance by the Court 
and the lack of a vast body of legal literature deconstructing its differing elements.  
I argue that through my textual compilation and analysis on the plethora of law 
reviews detailing the finite facets of each reproductive case, it appears the hypothesized 
statement asserted in the beginning of this thesis was partially accurate. Specifically, 
textual ambiguity and judicial ambivalence were evidenced to account for the instability 
and resulting lessened legitimacy of the right to an abortion. Although judicial 
ambivalence is inherently difficult to fully encapsulate and define in the first place, it 
seemed to be less salient in the case law analysis and it’s impact on the legal instability of 
abortion.   
On the flipside, the discredited doctrine of substantive due process (conceived 
initially as an exogenous third variable) played a more integral role in disrupting and 
further threading contention throughout reproductive privacy jurisprudence. As first fully 
formulated in Lochner, the substantive due process appeared to incur and propagate a 
more significant degree of divisiveness among the justices. Given its notorious past and 
capacity for transmitting judicial subjectivity within the rule of law, it seemed to have a 
compounding effect on an already convoluted abortion jurisprudence. Thus, it could be 
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argued that substantive due process was the catalyst and/or stimulus for the latter fruition 
of judicial ambivalence in the case law, although this is merely speculatory.  
I conclude that the legal framework and constitutional approach by the Court has 
proved to be highly problematic and subsequently proved ineffective in securely and 
legitimately grounding the right to an abortion. Additionally, I argue the increasingly 
fettered nature of the right to abortion in modern constitutional law is vividly evidenced 
by the Court’s inconsistent use of precedent and continuous, arbitrary alterations made to 
the original legal logic in Roe.  
In sum, I have argued that the Court has faced numerous struggles in sufficiently 
and effectively establishing a legal right to an abortion. In Lochner, the Court engaged 
and implemented an unclear substantive due process analysis to frame privacy as central 
to the inherent liberty of each individual. The Court’s subsequent invalidation of many 
economic regulations under this discredited substantive due process doctrine spurred vast 
criticism of inappropriate judicial activism. (Chlapowski, 1991, 3) Additionally, the 
Court refrained from adequately clarifying the parameters and extent of their 
conceptualization of liberty. This unsettled ambiguity inevitably marked the beginning of 
the Court’s troubles with constructing definitions with ample clarity and lucidity.  
With Lochner as a rocky and contested guiding precedent, the Court further 
compounded the instability of the fledgling right to privacy in Griswold. The Court again 
grappled with definitional clarity and clearly substantiating the legal roots of a largely 
unenumerated reproductive privacy right. In Griswold, the Court was highly splintered 
and divided on both the existence of a right to reproductive privacy and its location 
within legitimate constitutional principles. The subsequent fruit of their labor was a 
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fragmented, ambiguous privacy right laden with unclear applicability and legal 
instability.  
The Court’s logic and rationale in Roe followed a similar, confusing route. In Roe, 
the Court was still split on where exactly is this right to privacy in the Constitution. 
Similarly, their creation of a right to an abortion was problematic essentially because it 
was predicated and hinged on an already highly unstable right to privacy. As I have 
demonstrated, Roe’s unstable and unanchored foundation has produced a multitude of 
legal problems for the Court in successfully legitimizing this right in American 
constitutional law. I argue this instability embedded in the Griswold and Roe decisions 
has translated and trickled down into the most recent abortion cases such as Webster and 
Casey.  
Roe’s progeny further complicated and destabilized the right to an abortion 
through inconsistent modifications, vacillating standards of review, unclear terminology 
and lack of legitimate grounding legal principles. With the recent nominations of 
politically conservative justices such as Roberts and Alito, the tide has changed with a 
solid conservative majority now comprising the Supreme Court. (Chemerinsky, 2006, 8-
9) The legal future of a woman’s right to choose is beginning to look cloudy and grim. 
Thus, I have deduced that the Court has essentially built the right to an abortion in 
modern jurisprudence upon a house of cards; only time will tell when they will topple.  
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IV. The Human Rights Connection: Policy Implications for Abortion Rights  
 
 
 
I believe there is a better and more efficacious avenue to legitimately establish a 
women’s right to an abortion. In order to transcend the contention and divisiveness 
largely conjured by the members of the Supreme Court, there must be first be an implicit 
acknowledgment in textual law of the centrality of human rights to the essence of an 
individual’s liberty. By imbuing and integrating international human rights legal norms 
into the heart of domestic law, I argue this would create an open-texture to constitutional 
jurisprudence to permit the right to an abortion to be identified as a woman’s human 
right. This essentially entails a fundamental re-conceptualization of the right to an 
abortion, in which both parties (mother and fetus) are allocated rights creating the 
transitional, emergent nature of this evolving human right.  
In other words, the women’s right to an abortion would not be absolute; fetuses 
far into the third trimester should be granted the human right to life. (Smith, 2005, 207-
208) By transitioning to the utilization of human rights diction and a human rights 
oriented framework to codify the right to an abortion, this would essentially eliminate the 
instability of the current legal right to an abortion. Additionally, the accompanying 
volatility would also be largely extinguished by subverting the authority of the justices to 
overturn this right through an adoption of an automatic self-executing clause in hard law. 
(Richardson, 2000, 4) Thus, the United States should adopt a South African Approach to 
implementing human rights domestically. I advocate that a transition to utilizing a South 
African approach in contextualizing the right to an abortion in international human rights 
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law, which would provide a more efficacious platform in establishing this right in 
American modern law. (Thomas, 1997, 4) 
 Although the concept of human rights had been developed and re-articulated 
throughout history, it was not until the creation and establishment of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1945 that the actual term “human rights” was textually 
substantiated in the modern era. (Jackson, 2003, 2) With this universal body of law 
serving as the model for human right implementation internationally, I assert that the 
United States needs to adopt similarly phrased document in order effectively integrate 
human rights protections within domestic law. (Jackson, 2003, 2-3) As many human 
rights and legal scholars agree, South Africa has proved to be instrumental in emulating a 
pragmatic approach to legally grounding and embedding human rights norms within a 
structured system of law. (Slye, 2001, 2)  
 Legal human rights scholars depict a South African approach as a method 
drawing heavily on international human rights law, and directly inserting international 
norms and values into domestic bodies of law. (Wet, 2005, 2-3) I argue that utilizing this 
approach would eliminate both the textual ambiguity, problematic past of the substantive 
due process doctrine, and judicial ambivalence that has significantly convoluted and 
destabilized the right to an abortion.  
 Numerous international law scholars note the apprehension of numerous First 
World nations in adopting provisions from international bodies of law, which poses 
serious obstacles to the realization of human rights in American law. As Wet point out, 
these industrialized nations (including the United States) are highly protective of 
sovereignty and domestic values. (2005, 11) Unfortunately, the United States has had a 
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dark history of perpetrating what the international community would consider human 
rights violations, with little acknowledgement or reconciliation for these acts. (Jackson, 
2003, 2-3) This limited and apprehensive use of international legal norms by the U.S. 
indicates a serious impediment to successfully adopting a South African Approach. 
(Hovell and Williams, 2005, 13)  
 It is for this reason that I argue adopting and implementing only the three primary 
constructs that comprise the South African Approach to modern human rights. The first 
pillar of this approach would entail directly imbuing international human rights norms 
into the United States Constitution. (Hovell and Williams, 2005, 12) As demonstrated in 
the South African Constitution of 1996, both themes of equality and non-discrimination 
are centrally located at the heart of the legal document. (Hovell and Williams, 2005, 14) 
In particular, the “Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It 
enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of 
human dignity, equality and freedom.” (South African Constitution, Chapter 2, Section 1) 
With the concept of equality, the South African Constitution is able to better safeguard 
women’s human rights in contrast to the U.S. Constitution. (Jackson, 2003, 9-10)  
 The second pillar involves constructing  a judicial review body that would consist 
of two monitoring mechanisms. As in South African, I assert that by establishing a 
secondary legal body (a Human Rights Commission) to the Supreme Court, this would 
largely reduce the capacity for judicial subjectivity and textual ambiguity. (Wet 2005, 6) 
The primary function of the Human Rights Commission is to oversee the compliance to 
international human rights law, as well as providing an available body to which 
individuals can contact with human rights infringement complaints. (Hovell and 
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Willaims, 2005, 14) I argue that this construction of a human rights orientated, 
monitoring body would aid in clarifying the already convoluted abortion case law, in 
addition to implementing the right to an abortion as a women’s human right.  
 The third and final pillar is the incorporation of a self-executing provision into 
American domestic law. (Richardson, 2000, 4) According to international legal 
principles, self-executing rights (also known as directly applicable rights) essentially 
allow individuals to invoke a human right without the need for it to be indoctrinated and 
translated into domestic jurisprudence first (Richardson, 2000, 4-5) In this way, the 
enactment of a self-executing provision for a human right to an abortion would allow 
women to bypass constraining domestic laws and file complaints to the Human Right 
Commission.  
By adopting and implementing a South African approach to women’s human 
rights, I argue that this pragmatic method would solve many of the problematic issues 
inherent within the current right to an abortion. This approach will certainly not be easy 
or even feasible to fully implement at this current moment in American legal history. 
With the shadow of the Iraq war still looming over the nation, the United States is still 
fixated on other political pressing matters. Yet, I believe the future will hold many 
unforeseen developments in the realm of international human rights, because the future of 
a woman’s right to maintain autonomy over her reproductive faculties is far too important 
to simply ignore.  
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